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Abstract: In this paper, we consider a linear quadratic stochastic two-person nonzero-sum differential game.
Open-loop and closed-loop Nash equilibria are introduced. The existence of the former is characterized by
the solvability of a system of forward-backward stochastic differential equations, and that of the latter is
characterized by the solvability of a system of coupled symmetric Riccati differential equations. Sometimes,
open-loop Nash equilibria admit a closed-loop representation, via the solution to a system of non-symmetric
Riccati equations, which is different from the outcome of the closed-loop Nash equilibria in general. However,
it is found that for the case of zero-sum differential games, the Riccati equation system for the closed-
loop representation of open-loop saddle points coincides with that for the closed-loop saddle points, which
leads to the conclusion that the closed-loop representation of open-loop saddle points is the outcome of the
corresponding closed-loop saddle point as long as both exist. In particular, for linear quadratic optimal
control problem, the closed-loop representation of open-loop optimal controls coincides with the outcome of
the corresponding closed-loop optimal strategy, provided both exist.
Keywords: stochastic differential equation, linear quadratic differential game, two-person, nonzero-sum,
Nash equilibrium, Riccati differential equation, closed-loop, open-loop.
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1 Introduction
Let (Ω,F ,F,P) be a complete filtered probability space on which a standard one-dimensional Brownian
motion {W (t), t > 0} is defined such that F = {Ft}t>0 is the natural filtration of W (·) augmented by all the
P-null sets in F . Consider the following controlled linear (forward) stochastic differential equation (FSDE,
for short) on [t, T ]:
(1.1)

dX(s) =
[
A(s)X(s) +B1(s)u1(s) +B2(s)u2(s) + b(s)
]
ds
+
[
C(s)X(s) +D1(s)u1(s) +D2(s)u2(s) + σ(s)
]
dW (s), s ∈ [t, T ],
X(t) = x.
In the above, X(·) is called the state process taking values in the n-dimensional Euclidean space Rn with the
initial pair (t, x) ∈ [0, T )×Rn; for i = 1, 2, ui(·) is called the control process of Player i taking values in R
mi .
We assume that the coefficients A(·), B1(·), B2(·), C(·), D1(·), and D2(·) are deterministic matrix-valued
functions of proper dimensions, and that b(·) and σ(·) are F-progressively measurable processes taking values
in Rn. For i = 1, 2 and t ∈ [0, T ), we define
Ui[t, T ] =
{
ui : [t, T ]× Ω→ R
mi
∣∣ ui(·) is F-progressively measurable, E∫ T
t
|ui(s)|
2ds <∞
}
.
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Any element ui(·) ∈ Ui[t, T ] is called an admissible control of Player i on [t, T ]. Under some mild conditions
on the coefficients, for any initial pair (t, x) ∈ [0, T ) × Rn and controls ui(·) ∈ Ui[t, T ], i = 1, 2, the state
equation (1.1) admits a unique solution X(·) ≡ X(· ; t, x, u1(·), u2(·)). The cost functional for Player i is
defined by the following:
(1.2)
J i(t, x;u1(·), u2(·)) , E
{
〈GiX(T ), X(T )〉+ 2〈gi, X(T )〉
+
∫ T
t
[
〈


Qi(s) Si
1
(s)⊤ Si
2
(s)⊤
Si
1
(s) Ri
11
(s) Ri
12
(s)
Si
2
(s) Ri
21
(s) Ri
22
(s)




X(s)
u1(s)
u2(s)

,


X(s)
u1(s)
u2(s)

〉+ 2〈


qi(s)
ρi
1
(s)
ρi
2
(s)

,


X(s)
u1(s)
u2(s)

〉
]
ds
}
,
where Qi(·), Si1(·), S
i
2(·), R
i
11(·), R
i
12(·), R
i
21(·), and R
i
22(·) are deterministic matrix-valued functions of
proper dimensions with
Qi(·)⊤ = Qi(·), Rijj(·)
⊤ = Rijj(·), R
i
12(·)
⊤ = Ri21(·), i, j = 1, 2,
where the superscript ⊤ denotes the transpose of matrices, and Gi is a symmetric matrix; qi(·), ρi1(·),
and ρi2(·) are allowed to be vector-valued F-progressively measurable processes, and g
i is allowed to be an
FT -measurable random vector. Then we can formally pose the following problem.
Problem (SDG). For any initial pair (t, x) ∈ [0, T )× Rn and i = 1, 2, Player i wants to find a control
u∗i (·) ∈ Ui[t, T ] such that the cost functional J
i(t, x;u1(·), u2(·)) is minimized.
The above posed problem is referred to as a linear quadratic (LQ, for short) stochastic two-person
differential game. In the case
(1.3)
J1(t, x;u1(·), u2(·)) + J
2(t, x;u1(·), u2(·)) = 0,
∀ (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn, ∀ui(·) ∈ Ui[t, T ], i = 1, 2,
the corresponding Problem (SDG) is called an LQ stochastic two-person zero-sum differential game. To
guarantee (1.3), one usually assumes that
(1.4)
G1 +G2 = 0, g1 + g2 = 0, Q1(·) +Q2(·) = 0, q1(·) + q2(·) = 0,
S1j (·) + S
2
j (·) = 0, R
1
jk(·) +R
2
jk(·) = 0, ρ
1
j(·) + ρ
2
j(·) = 0, j, k = 1, 2.
We refer the readers to [23] (and the references cited therein) for the case of LQ stochastic two-person
zero-sum differential games. Recall that in [23], open-loop and closed-loop saddle points were introduced
and it was established that the existence of an open-loop saddle point for the problem is equivalent to the
solvability of a forward-backward stochastic differential equation (FBSDE, for short), and the existence of a
closed-loop saddle point for the problem is equivalent to the solvability of a (differential) Riccati equation.
In this paper, we will not assume (1.4) so that (1.3) is not necessarily true. Such a Problem (SDG) is usually
referred to as an LQ stochastic two-person nonzero-sum differential game, emphasizing that (1.3) is not
assumed. We have two main goals in this paper: Establish a theory for Problem (SDG) parallel to that of
[23] (for zero-sum case); and study the difference between the closed-loop representation of open-loop Nash
equilibria and the outcome of closed-loop Nash equilibria. It turns out that the above-mentioned difference
for the non-zero sum case is indicated through the symmetry of the corresponding Riccati equations: One
is symmetric and the other is not. On the other hand, we found that the situation in the zero-sum case,
which was not discussed in [23], is totally different: The closed-loop representation of open-loop saddle points
coincides with the outcome of the corresponding closed-loop saddle point, when both exist. In particular,
for stochastic linear quadratic optimal control problem, the closed-loop representation of open-loop optimal
controls is the outcome of the corresponding closed-loop optimal strategy ([22]).
Mathematically, posing condition (1.4) makes the structure of the problem much simpler, since with such
a condition, only one performance index is needed, for which one player is the minimizer and the other
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player is the maximizer. However, as we know that in the real life, each player should have his/her own cost
functional, and even for the totally hostile situation, the objectives of the opponents might not necessarily
be exactly the opposite (zero-sum). Therefore, realistically, it is more meaningful to investigate Problem
(SDG) without assuming (1.4). By the way, although we will not discuss such a situation in the current
paper, we still would like to point out that sometimes, certain cooperations between the players might result
in both players rewarded more.
Static version of nonzero-sum differential games could be regarded as a kind of non-cooperative games
for which one can trace back to the work of Nash [19]. For some early works on nonzero-sum differential
games, we would like to mention Lukes–Russell [14], Friedman [7], and Bensoussan [1]. In the past two
decays, due to the appearance of backward stochastic differential equations (BSDEs, for short), some new
and interesting works published; Among them, we would like to mention [8, 9, 6, 4, 21, 10].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 will collect some preliminaries. Among other
things, we will recall some known results on LQ optimal control problems. In Section 3, we will introduce
open-loop and closed-loop Nash equilibria. A characterization of the existence of open-loop Nash equilibria
in terms of solvability of two coupled FBSDEs will be presented in Section 4. Section 5 is devoted to
the discussion on the closed-loop Nash equilibria whose existence is characterized by the solvability of two
coupled symmetric Riccati equations. In Section 6, we will present two examples showing the difference
between open-loop and closed-loop Nash equilibria. In Section 7, closed-loop representation of open-loop
Nash equilibria will be studied, and comparison between the closed-loop representation of open-loop Nash
equilibria and the outcome of closed-loop Nash equilibria will be carried out. Finally, we will take a deeper
look at the situation for LQ zero-sum games in Section 8.
2 Preliminaries
Let Rn×m be the space of all (n×m) matrices and Sn ⊆ Rn×n be the set of all (n× n) symmetric matrices.
The inner product 〈· , ·〉 on Rn×m is given by 〈M,N〉 7→ tr (M⊤N), and the induced norm is given by
|M | =
√
tr (M⊤M). We denote by R(M) the range of a matrix M , and for M,N ∈ Sn we use the notation
M > N (respectively, M > N) to indicate that M − N is positive semi-definite (respectively, positive
definite). Recall that any M ∈ Rn×m admits a unique (Moore–Penrose) pseudo-inverse M † ∈ Rm×n having
the following properties ([20]):
MM †M =M, M †MM † =M †, (MM †)⊤ =MM †, (M †M)⊤ =M †M.
Further, if M ∈ Rn×m and Ψ ∈ Rn×ℓ such that
R(Ψ) ⊆ R(M),
then all the solutions Θ to the linear equation
MΘ = Ψ
are given by the following:
Θ =M †Ψ+ (I −M †M)Γ, Γ ∈ Rm×ℓ.
In addition, if M =M⊤ ∈ Sn, then
M † = (M †)⊤, MM † =M †M ; and M > 0 ⇐⇒ M † > 0.
Next, let T > 0 be a fixed time horizon. For any t ∈ [0, T ] and Euclidean space H, we introduce the following
spaces of deterministic functions:
Lp(t, T ;H) =
{
ϕ : [t, T ]→ H
∣∣ ∫ T
t
|ϕ(s)|pds <∞
}
, 1 6 p <∞,
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L∞(t, T ;H) =
{
ϕ : [t, T ]→ H
∣∣ esssup
s∈[t,T ]
|ϕ(s)| <∞
}
,
C([t, T ];H) =
{
ϕ : [t, T ]→ H
∣∣ ϕ(·) is continuous}.
Further, we introduce the following spaces of random variables and stochastic processes: For any t ∈ [0, T ],
L2Ft(Ω;H) =
{
ξ : Ω→ H
∣∣ ξ is Ft-measurable, E|ξ|2 <∞},
L2
F
(t, T ;H) =
{
ϕ : [t, T ]× Ω→ H
∣∣ ϕ(·) is F-progressively measurable, E∫ T
t
|ϕ(s)|2ds <∞
}
,
L2
F
(Ω;C([t, T ];H)) =
{
ϕ : [t, T ]× Ω→ H
∣∣ ϕ(·) is F-adapted, continuous, E( sup
t6s6T
|ϕ(s)|2
)
<∞
}
,
L2
F
(Ω;L1(t, T ;H)) =
{
ϕ : [t, T ]× Ω→ H
∣∣ ϕ(·) is F-progressively measurable, E( ∫ T
t
|ϕ(s)|ds
)2
<∞
}
.
We now recall some results on stochastic LQ optimal control problems. Consider the state equation
(2.1)

dX(s) =
[
A(s)X(s) +B(s)u(s) + b(s)
]
ds
+
[
C(s)X(s) +D(s)u(s) + σ(s)
]
dW (s), s ∈ [t, T ],
X(t) = x.
The cost functional takes the following form:
(2.2)
J(t, x;u(·)) , E
{
〈GX(T ), X(T )〉+ 2〈g,X(T )〉
+
∫ T
t
[
〈

Q(s) S(s)
⊤
S(s) R(s)



X(s)
u(s)

,

X(s)
u(s)

〉+ 2〈

q(s)
ρ(s)

,

X(s)
u(s)

〉
]
ds
}
.
We adopt the following assumptions.
(S1) The coefficients of the state equation satisfy the following:{
A(·) ∈ L1(0, T ;Rn×n), B(·) ∈ L2(0, T ;Rn×m), b(·) ∈ L2
F
(Ω;L1(0, T ;Rn)),
C(·) ∈ L2(0, T ;Rn×n), D(·) ∈ L∞(0, T ;Rn×m), σ(·) ∈ L2
F
(0, T ;Rn).
(S2) The weighting coefficients in the cost functional satisfy the following:{
Q(·) ∈ L1(0, T ; Sn), S(·) ∈ L2(0, T ;Rm×n), R(·) ∈ L∞(0, T ; Sm),
q(·) ∈ L2
F
(Ω;L1(0, T ;Rn)), ρ(·) ∈ L2
F
(0, T ;Rm), g ∈ L2FT (Ω;R
n), G ∈ Sn.
Note that under (S1), for any (t, x) ∈ [0, T ) × Rn and u(·) ∈ U [t, T ] ≡ L2
F
(t, T ;Rm), the state equation
(2.1) admits a unique strong solution X(·) ≡ X(· ; t, x, u(·)). Further, if (S2) is also assumed, then the cost
functional (2.2) is well-defined for every (t, x) ∈ [0, T ) × Rn and u(·) ∈ U [t, T ]. Therefore, the following
problem is meaningful.
Problem (SLQ). For any given initial pair (t, x) ∈ [0, T )× Rn, find a u¯(·) ∈ U [t, T ] such that
(2.3) J(t, x; u¯(·)) = inf
u(·)∈U [t,T ]
J(t, x;u(·)).
Any u¯(·) ∈ U [t, T ] satisfying (2.3) is called an open-loop optimal control of Problem (SLQ) for (t, x); the
corresponding X¯(·) ≡ X(· ; t, x, u¯(·)) is called an open-loop optimal state process and (X¯(·), u¯(·)) is called an
open-loop optimal pair.
Definition 2.1. Let (t, x) ∈ [0, T )× Rn. If there exists a (unique) u¯(·) ∈ U [t, T ] such that (2.3) holds,
then we say that Problem (SLQ) is (uniquely) open-loop solvable at (t, x). If Problem (SLQ) is (uniquely)
open-loop solvable for any (t, x) ∈ [0, T ) × Rn, then we say that Problem (SLQ) is (uniquely) open-loop
solvable on [0, T )× Rn.
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The following result is concerned with open-loop optimal controls of Problem (SLQ) for a given initial
pair, whose proof can be found in [23] (see also [22]).
Theorem 2.2. Let (S1)–(S2) hold. For a given initial pair (t, x) ∈ [0, T ) × Rn, a state-control pair
(X¯(·), u¯(·)) is an open-loop optimal pair of Problem (SLQ) if and only if the following hold:
(i) The stationarity condition holds:
B(s)⊤Y¯ (s) +D(s)⊤Z¯(s) + S(s)X¯(s) +R(s)u¯(s) + ρ(s) = 0, a.e. s ∈ [t, T ], a.s.
where (Y¯ (·), Z¯(·)) is the adapted solution to the following BSDE:{
dY¯ (s) = −
[
A(s)⊤Y¯ (s) + C(s)⊤Z¯(s) +Q(s)X¯(s) + S(s)⊤u¯(s) + q(s)
]
ds+ Z¯(s)dW (s), s ∈ [t, T ],
Y¯ (T ) = GX¯(T ) + g.
(ii) The map u(·) 7→ J(t, 0;u(·)) is convex.
Next, for any given t ∈ [0, T ), take Θ(·) ∈ L2(t, T ;Rm×n) ≡ Q[t, T ] and v(·) ∈ U [t, T ]. For any x ∈ Rn,
let us consider the following equation:
(2.4)

dX(s) =
{
[A(s) +B(s)Θ(s)]X(s) +B(s)v(s) + b(s)
}
ds
+
{
[C(s) +D(s)Θ(s)]X(s) +D(s)v(s) + σ(s)
}
dW (s), s ∈ [t, T ],
X(t) = x,
which admits a unique solution X(·) ≡ X(· ; t, x,Θ(·), v(·)), depending on Θ(·) and v(·). The above is called
a closed-loop system of the original state equation (2.1) under closed-loop strategy (Θ(·), v(·)). We point out
that (Θ(·), v(·)) is independent of the initial state x. With the above corresponding solution X(·), we define
J(t, x; Θ(·)X(·) + v(·)) = E
{
〈GX(T ), X(T )〉+ 2〈g,X(T )〉
+
∫ T
t
[
〈

Q(s) S(s)
⊤
S(s) R(s)



 X(s)
Θ(s)X(s)+v(s)

,

 X(s)
Θ(s)X(s)+v(s)

〉+ 2〈

q(s)
ρ(s)

,

 X(s)
Θ(s)X(s)+v(s)

〉
]
ds
}
.
We now recall the following definition.
Definition 2.3. A pair (Θ¯(·), v¯(·)) ∈ Q[t, T ]×U [t, T ] is called a closed-loop optimal strategy of Problem
(SLQ) on [t, T ] if
(2.5)
J(t, x; Θ¯(·)X¯(·) + v¯(·)) 6 J(t, x; Θ(·)X(·) + v(·)),
∀x ∈ Rn, ∀ (Θ(·), v(·)) ∈ Q[t, T ]× U [t, T ],
where X¯(·) = X(· ; t, x, Θ¯(·), v¯(·)), and X(·) = X(· ; t, x,Θ(·), v(·)).
We emphasize that the pair (Θ¯(·), v¯(·)) is required to be independent of the initial state x ∈ Rn. It is
interesting that the following equivalent theorem holds.
Proposition 2.4. Let (S1)–(S2) hold and let (Θ¯(·), v¯(·)) ∈ Q[t, T ] × U [t, T ]. Then the following state-
ments are equivalent:
(i) (Θ¯(·), v¯(·)) is a closed-loop optimal strategy of Problem (SLQ) on [t, T ].
(ii) For any x ∈ Rn and v(·) ∈ U [t, T ],
J(t, x; Θ¯(·)X¯(·) + v¯(·)) 6 J(t, x; Θ¯(·)X(·) + v(·)),
where X¯(·) = X(· ; t, x, Θ¯(·), v¯(·)) and X(·) = X(· ; t, x, Θ¯(·), v(·)).
(iii) For any x ∈ Rn and u(·) ∈ U [t, T ],
(2.6) J(t, x; Θ¯(·)X¯(·) + v¯(·)) 6 J(t, x;u(·)),
where X¯(·) = X(· ; t, x, Θ¯(·), v¯(·)).
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Proof. The implication (i) ⇒ (ii) follows by taking Θ(·) = Θ¯(·) in (2.5).
For the implication (ii) ⇒ (iii), take any u(·) ∈ U [t, T ] and let X(·) = X(· ; t, x, u(·)). Then
dX(s) =
{
[A(s) +B(s)Θ¯(s)]X(s) +B(s)[u(s)− Θ¯(s)X(s)] + b(s)
}
ds
+
{
[C(s) +D(s)Θ¯(s)]X(s) +D(s)[u(s)− Θ¯(s)X(s)] + σ(s)
}
dW (s),
with X(t) = x. Thus, if let
v(·) = u(·)− Θ¯(·)X(·),
we have
J(t, x; Θ¯(·)X¯(·) + v¯(·)) 6 J(t, x; Θ¯(·)X(·) + v(·)) = J(t, x;u(·)),
which proves (iii).
For the implication (iii) ⇒ (i), take any (Θ(·), v(·)) ∈ Q[t, T ] × U [t, T ] and let X(·) be the solution to
(2.4). Let u(·) = Θ(·)X(·) + v(·), Then by (iii), we have
J(t, x; Θ¯(·)X¯(·) + v¯(·)) 6 J(t, x;u(·)) = J(t, x; Θ(·)X(·) + v(·)).
This completes the proof.
From the above result, we see that if (Θ¯(·), v¯(·)) is a closed-loop optimal strategy of Problem (SLQ) on
[t, T ], then for any fixed initial state x ∈ Rn, with X¯(·) denoting the state process corresponding to (t, x)
and (Θ¯(·), v¯(·)), (2.6) implies that the outcome
u¯(·) ≡ Θ¯(·)X¯(·) + v¯(·) ∈ U [t, T ]
is an open-loop optimal control of Problem (SLQ) for (t, x). Therefore, for Problem (SLQ), the existence of
closed-loop strategies on [t, T ] implies the existence of open-loop optimal controls for initial pair (t, x) for
any x ∈ Rn. We point out that the situation will be different for two-person differential games. Details will
be carried out later.
For closed-loop optimal strategies, we have the following characterization ([23, 22]).
Theorem 2.5. Let (S1)–(S2) hold. Then Problem (SLQ) admits a closed-loop optimal strategy on [t, T ]
if and only if the following Riccati equation admits a solution P (·) ∈ C([t, T ]; Sn):
P˙ + PA+A⊤P + C⊤PC +Q
− (PB + C⊤PD + S⊤)(R +D⊤PD)†(B⊤P +D⊤PC + S) = 0, a.e. on [t, T ],
R(B⊤P +D⊤PC + S) ⊆ R(R+D⊤PD), a.e. on [t, T ],
R+D⊤PD > 0, a.e. on [t, T ],
P (T ) = G,
such that
(R+D⊤PD)†(B⊤P +D⊤PC + S) ∈ L2(t, T ;Rm×n),
and the adapted solution (η(·), ζ(·)) to the BSDE
dη = −
{[
A−B(R+D⊤PD)†(B⊤P +D⊤PC + S)
]⊤
η
+
[
C −D(R+D⊤PD)†(B⊤P +D⊤PC + S)
]⊤
ζ
+
[
C −D(R+D⊤PD)†(B⊤P +D⊤PC + S)
]⊤
Pσ
− (PB + C⊤PD + S⊤)(R+D⊤PD)†ρ+ Pb+ q
}
ds+ ζdW, s ∈ [t, T ],
η(T ) = g,
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satisfies {
B⊤η +D⊤ζ +D⊤Pσ + ρ ∈ R(R+D⊤PD), a.e. s ∈ [t, T ], a.s.
(R +D⊤PD)†(B⊤η +D⊤ζ +D⊤Pσ + ρ) ∈ L2
F
(t, T ;Rm).
In this case, any closed-loop optimal strategy (Θ¯(·), v¯(·)) of Problem (SLQ) admits the following represen-
tation: {
Θ¯ = − (R +D⊤PD)†(B⊤P +D⊤PC + S) +
[
I − (R+D⊤PD)†(R+D⊤PD)
]
θ,
v¯ = − (R +D⊤PD)†(B⊤η +D⊤ζ +D⊤Pσ + ρ) +
[
I − (R +D⊤PD)†(R+D⊤PD)
]
ν,
for some θ(·) ∈ L2(t, T ;Rm×n) and ν(·) ∈ L2
F
(t, T ;Rm). Further, the value function is given by
V (t, x) = E
{
〈P (t)x, x〉 + 2〈η(t), x〉 +
∫ T
t
[
〈Pσ, σ〉 + 2〈η, b〉+ 2〈ζ, σ〉
−
〈
(R +D⊤PD)†(B⊤η +D⊤ζ +D⊤Pσ + ρ), B⊤η +D⊤ζ +D⊤Pσ + ρ
〉]
ds
}
.
3 Stochastic Differential Games
We return to our Problem (SDG). Recall the sets Ui[t, T ] = L
2
F
(t, T ;Rmi) of all open-loop controls of Player
i (i = 1, 2). For notational simplicity, we let m = m1 +m2 and denote
B(·) = (B1(·), B2(·)), D(·) = (D1(·), D2(·)),
Si(·)=
(
Si1(·)
Si2(·)
)
, Ri(·)=
(
Ri11(·) R
i
12(·)
Ri21(·) R
i
22(·)
)
≡
(
Ri1(·)
Ri2(·)
)
, ρi(·)=
(
ρi1(·)
ρi2(·)
)
, u(·)=
(
u1(·)
u2(·)
)
.
Naturally, we identify U [t, T ] = U1[t, T ]× U2[t, T ]. With such notations, the state equation becomes
(3.1)

dX(s) =
[
A(s)X(s) +B(s)u(s) + b(s)
]
ds
+
[
C(s)X(s) +D(s)u(s) + σ(s)
]
dW (s), s ∈ [t, T ],
X(t) = x,
and the cost functionals become (i = 1, 2)
J i(t, x;u(·)) = E
{
〈GiX(T ), X(T )〉+ 2〈gi, X(T )〉
+
∫ T
t
[〈
Q
i(s) Si(s)⊤
Si(s) Ri(s)



X(s)
u(s)

,

X(s)
u(s)


〉
+2
〈
q
i(s)
ρi(s)

,

X(s)
u(s)


〉]
ds
}
.
Now let us introduce the following standard assumptions:
(G1) The coefficients of the state equation satisfy the following:{
A(·) ∈ L1(0, T ;Rn×n), B(·) ∈ L2(0, T ;Rn×m), b(·) ∈ L2
F
(Ω;L1(0, T ;Rn)),
C(·) ∈ L2(0, T ;Rn×n), D(·) ∈ L∞(0, T ;Rn×m), σ(·) ∈ L2
F
(0, T ;Rn).
(G2) The weighting coefficients in the cost functionals satisfy the following: For i = 1, 2,{
Qi(·) ∈ L1(0, T ; Sn), Si(·) ∈ L2(0, T ;Rm×n), Ri(·) ∈ L∞(0, T ; Sm),
qi(·) ∈ L2
F
(Ω;L1(0, T ;Rn)), ρi(·) ∈ L2
F
(0, T ;Rm), gi ∈ L2FT (Ω;R
n), Gi ∈ Sn.
Under (G1), for any (t, x) ∈ [0, T )× Rn and u(·) = (u1(·)
⊤, u2(·)
⊤)⊤ ∈ U [t, T ], equation (3.1) admits a
unique solution ([26])
X(·) , X(· ; t, x, u1(·), u2(·)) ≡ X(· ; t, x, u(·)) ∈ L
2
F
(Ω;C([t, T ];Rn)).
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Moreover, the following estimate holds:
E
(
sup
t6s6T
|X(s)|2
)
6 KE
{
|x|2 +
( ∫ T
t
|b(s)|ds
)2
+
∫ T
t
|σ(s)|2ds+
∫ T
t
|u(s)|2ds
}
,
where K > 0 represents a generic constant. Therefore, under (G1)–(G2), the cost functionals J i(t, x;u(·)) ≡
J i(t, x;u1(·), u2(·)) are well-defined for all (t, x) ∈ [0, T ) × R
n and all (u1(·), u2(·)) ∈ U1[t, T ] × U2[t, T ].
Having the above, we now introduce the following definition.
Definition 3.1. A pair (u∗1(·), u
∗
2(·)) ∈ U1[t, T ] × U2[t, T ] is called an open-loop Nash equilibrium of
Problem (SDG) for the initial pair (t, x) ∈ [0, T )× Rn if
(3.2)
J1(t, x;u∗1(·), u
∗
2(·)) 6 J
1(t, x;u1(·), u
∗
2(·)), ∀u1(·) ∈ U1[t, T ],
J2(t, x;u∗1(·), u
∗
2(·)) 6 J
2(t, x;u∗1(·), u2(·)), ∀u2(·) ∈ U2[t, T ].
Next, we denote
Qi[t, T ] = L
2(t, T ;Rmi×n), i = 1, 2.
For any initial pair (t, x) ∈ [0, T )×Rn, Θ(·) ≡ (Θ1(·)
⊤,Θ2(·)
⊤)⊤ ∈ Q1[t, T ]×Q2[t, T ] and any v(·) ≡ (v1(·)
⊤,
v2(·)
⊤)⊤ ∈ U1[t, T ]× U2[t, T ], consider the following system:
(3.3)

dX(s) =
{
[A(s) +B(s)Θ(s)]X(s) +B(s)v(s) + b(s)
}
ds
+
{
[C(s) +D(s)Θ(s)]X(s) +D(s)v(s) + σ(s)
}
dW (s), s ∈ [t, T ],
X(t) = x.
Under (G1), the above admits a unique solution X(·) ≡ X(· ; t, x,Θ1(·), v1(·),Θ2(·), v2(·)). If we denote
(3.4) ui(·) = Θi(·)X(·) + vi(·), i = 1, 2,
then the above (3.3) coincides with the original state equation (1.1). We call (Θi(·), vi(·)) a closed-loop
strategy of Player i, and call (3.3) the closed-loop system of the original system under closed-loop strategies
(Θ1(·), v1(·)) and (Θ2(·), v2(·)) of Players 1 and 2. Also, we call u(·) ≡ (u1(·)
⊤, u2(·)
⊤)⊤ with ui(·) defined
by (3.4) the outcome of the closed-loop strategy (Θ(·), v(·)). With the solution X(·) to (3.3), we denote
(3.5)
J i(t, x; Θ(·)X(·) + v(·)) ≡ J i(t, x; Θ1(·)X(·) + v1(·),Θ2(·)X(·) + v2(·))
= E
{
〈GiX(T ), X(T )〉+ 2〈gi, X(T )〉
+
∫ T
t
[〈
Q
i (Si)⊤
Si Ri



 X
ΘX+v

,

 X
ΘX+v


〉
+ 2
〈
q
i
ρi

,

 X
ΘX+v


〉]
ds
}
= E
{
〈GiX(T ), X(T )〉+ 2〈gi, X(T )〉
+
∫ T
t
[〈
Q
i+Θ⊤Si+(Si)⊤Θ+Θ⊤RiΘ (Si)⊤+Θ⊤Ri
Si+RiΘ Ri



X
v

,

X
v


〉
+ 2
〈
q
i+Θ⊤ρi
ρi

,

X
v


〉]
ds
}
.
Similarly, one can define J i(t, x; Θ1(·)X(·) + v1(·), u2(·)) and J
i(t, x;u1(·),Θ2(·)X(·) + v2(·)). We now intro-
duce the following definition.
Definition 3.2. A 4-tuple (Θ∗1(·), v
∗
1(·); Θ
∗
2(·), v
∗
2(·)) ∈ Q1[t, T ] × U1[t, T ] × Q2[t, T ] × U2[t, T ] is called
a closed-loop Nash equilibrium of Problem (SDG) on [t, T ] if for any x ∈ Rn and any 4-tuple (Θ1(·), v1(·);
Θ2(·), v2(·)) ∈ Q1[t, T ]× U1[t, T ]×Q2[t, T ]× U2[t, T ], the following hold:
J1(t, x; Θ∗1(·)X
∗(·) + v∗1(·),Θ
∗
2(·)X
∗(·) + v∗2(·)) 6 J
1(t, x; Θ1(·)X(·) + v1(·),Θ
∗
2(·)X(·) + v
∗
2(·)),(3.6)
J2(t, x; Θ∗1(·)X
∗(·) + v∗1(·),Θ
∗
2(·)X
∗(·) + v∗2(·)) 6 J
2(t, x; Θ∗1(·)X(·) + v
∗
1(·),Θ2(·)X(·) + v2(·)).(3.7)
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Note that in both (3.6) and (3.7),
X∗(·) = X(· ; t, x,Θ∗1(·), v
∗
1(·),Θ
∗
2(·), v
∗
2(·)),
whereas, in (3.6),
X(·) = X(· ; t, x,Θ1(·), v1(·),Θ
∗
2(·), v
∗
2(·)),
and in (3.7),
X(·) = X(· ; t, x,Θ∗1(·), v
∗
1(·),Θ2(·), v2(·)).
Thus, X(·) appeared in (3.6) and (3.7) are different in general. We emphasize that the closed-loop Nash
equilibrium (Θ∗1(·), v
∗
1(·); Θ
∗
2(·), v
∗
2(·)) is independent of the initial state x. The following result provides some
equivalent definitions of closed-loop Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 3.3. Let (G1)–(G2) hold and let (Θ∗1(·), v
∗
1(·); Θ
∗
2(·), v
∗
2(·)) ∈ Q1[t, T ]×U1[t, T ]×Q2[t, T ]×
U2[t, T ]. Then the following are equivalent:
(i) (Θ∗1(·), v
∗
1(·); Θ
∗
2(·), v
∗
2(·)) is a closed-loop Nash equilibrium of Problem (SDG) on [t, T ].
(ii) For any (v1(·), v2(·)) ∈ U1[t, T ]× U2[t, T ],
J1(t, x; Θ∗1(·)X
∗(·) + v∗1(·),Θ
∗
2(·)X
∗(·) + v∗2(·)) 6 J
1(t, x; Θ∗1(·)X(·) + v1(·),Θ
∗
2(·)X(·) + v
∗
2(·)),
J2(t, x; Θ∗1(·)X
∗(·) + v∗1(·),Θ
∗
2(·)X
∗(·) + v∗2(·)) 6 J
2(t, x; Θ∗1(·)X(·) + v
∗
1(·),Θ
∗
2(·)X(·) + v2(·)).
(iii) For any (u1(·), u2(·)) ∈ U1[t, T ]× U2[t, T ],
J1(t, x; Θ∗1(·)X
∗(·) + v∗1(·),Θ
∗
2(·)X
∗(·) + v∗2(·)) 6 J
1(t, x;u1(·),Θ
∗
2(·)X(·) + v
∗
2(·)),(3.8)
J2(t, x; Θ∗1(·)X
∗(·) + v∗1(·),Θ
∗
2(·)X
∗(·) + v∗2(·)) 6 J
2(t, x; Θ∗1(·)X(·) + v
∗
1(·), u2(·)).(3.9)
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Proposition 2.4.
If we denote
(3.10) u¯i(·) = Θ
∗
i (·)X
∗(·) + v∗i (·), i = 1, 2,
then (3.8)–(3.9) become
J1(t, x; u¯1(·), u¯2(·)) 6 J
1(t, x;u1(·),Θ
∗
2(·)X(·) + v
∗
2(·)),(3.11)
J2(t, x; u¯1(·), u¯2(·)) 6 J
2(t, x; Θ∗1(·)X(·) + v
∗
1(·), u2(·)).(3.12)
Since in (3.11), X(·) corresponds to u1(·) and (Θ
∗
2(·), v
∗
2(·)), one might not have
u¯2(·) = Θ
∗
2(·)X(·) + v
∗
2(·).
Likewise, one might not have the following either:
u¯1(·) = Θ
∗
1(·)X(·) + v
∗
1(·).
Hence, comparing this with (3.2), we see that the outcome (u¯1(·), u¯2(·)) of the closed-loop Nash equilibrium
(Θ∗1(·), v
∗
1(·); Θ
∗
2(·), v
∗
2(·)) defined by (3.10) is not an open-loop Nash equilibrium of Problem (SDG) for
(t,X∗(t)) in general.
On the other hand, if (Θ∗1(·), v
∗
1(·); Θ
∗
2(·), v
∗
2(·)) is a closed-loop Nash equilibrium of Problem (SDG) on
[t, T ], we may consider the following state equation (denoting Θ∗(·) = (Θ∗1(·)
⊤,Θ∗2(·)
⊤)⊤)
(3.13)
{
dX(s)=
[
(A+BΘ∗)X+B1v1+B2v2+b
]
ds+
[
(C+DΘ∗)X+D1v1+D2v2+σ
]
dW (s), s ∈ [t, T ],
X(t) = x,
with cost functionals
(3.14) J˜ i(t, x; v1(·), v2(·)) = J
i(t, x; Θ∗1(·)X(·) + v1(·),Θ
∗
2(·)X(·) + v2(·)), i = 1, 2.
Then by (ii) of Proposition 3.3, (v∗1(·), v
∗
2(·)) is an open-loop Nash equilibrium of the corresponding (nonzero-
sum differential) problem. Such an observation will be very useful below.
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4 Open-Loop Nash Equilibria and FBSDEs
In this section, we discuss the open-loop Nash equilibria for Problem (SDG) in terms of FBSDEs. The main
result of this section can be stated as follows.
Theorem 4.1. Let (G1)–(G2) hold and let (t, x) ∈ [0, T )×Rn be given. Then u∗(·) ≡ (u∗1(·)
⊤, u∗2(·)
⊤)⊤ ∈
U1[t, T ]× U2[t, T ] is an open-loop Nash equilibrium of Problem (SDG) for (t, x) if and only if the following
two conditions hold:
(i) For i = 1, 2, the adapted solution (X∗(·), Y ∗i (·), Z
∗
i (·)) to the FBSDE on [t, T ]
(4.1)

dX∗(s) =
[
A(s)X∗(s) +B(s)u∗(s) + b(s)
]
ds+
[
C(s)X∗(s) +D(s)u∗(s) + σ(s)
]
dW (s),
dY ∗i (s) = −
[
A(s)⊤Y ∗i (s) + C(s)
⊤Z∗i (s) +Q
i(s)X∗(s) + Si(s)⊤u∗(s) + qi(s)
]
ds+ Z∗i (s)dW (s),
X∗(t) = x, Y ∗i (T ) = G
iX∗(T ) + gi,
satisfies the following stationarity condition:
(4.2) Bi(s)
⊤Y ∗i (s) +Di(s)
⊤Z∗i (s) + S
i
i(s)X
∗(s) +Rii(s)u
∗(s) + ρii(s) = 0, a.e. s ∈ [t, T ], a.s.
(ii) For i = 1, 2, the following convexity condition holds:
(4.3)
E
{∫ T
t
[〈
Qi(s)Xi(s), Xi(s)
〉
+ 2
〈
Sii(s)Xi(s), ui(s)
〉
+
〈
Riii(s)ui(s), ui(s)
〉]
ds
+
〈
GiXi(T ), Xi(T )
〉}
> 0, ∀ui(·) ∈ Ui[t, T ],
where Xi(·) is the solution to the following FSDE:
(4.4)
{
dXi(s) =
[
A(s)Xi(s) +Bi(s)ui(s)
]
ds+
[
C(s)Xi(s) +Di(s)ui(s)
]
dW (s), s ∈ [t, T ],
Xi(t) = 0.
Or, equivalently, the map ui(·) 7→ J
i(t, x;u(·)) is convex (for i = 1, 2).
Proof. For a given (t, x) ∈ [0, T )×Rn and u∗(·) ∈ U [t, T ], let (X∗(·), Y ∗1 (·), Z
∗
1 (·)) be the adapted solution
to FBSDE (4.1) with i = 1. For any u1(·) ∈ U1[t, T ] and ε ∈ R, let X
ε(·) be the solution to the following
perturbed state equation on [t, T ]:
dXε(s) =
{
A(s)Xε(s) +B1(s)[u
∗
1(s) + εu1(s)] +B2(s)u
∗
2(s) + b(s)
}
ds
+
{
C(s)Xε(s) +D1(s)[u
∗
1(s) + εu1(s)] +D2(s)u
∗
2(s) + σ(s)
}
dW (s),
Xε(t) = x.
Then denoting X1(·) the solution of (4.4) with i = 1, we have X
ε(·) = X∗(·) + εX1(·) and
J1(t, x;u∗1(·) + εu1(·), u
∗
2(·)) − J
1(t, x;u∗1(·), u
∗
2(·))
= εE
{〈
G1[2X∗(T ) + εX1(T )], X1(T )〉+ 2〈g
1, X1(T )
〉
+
∫ T
t
[〈Q
1 (S1
1
)⊤ (S1
2
)⊤
S1
1
R1
11
R1
12
S1
2
R1
21
R1
22




2X∗+εX1
2u∗
1
+εu1
2u∗
2

,


X1
u1
0


〉
+ 2
〈
q
1
ρ1
1

,

X1
u1


〉]
ds
}
= 2εE
{〈
G1X∗(T ) + g1, X1(T )
〉
+
∫ T
t
[〈
Q1X∗ + (S1)⊤u∗ + q1, X1
〉
+
〈
S11X
∗ +R11u
∗ + ρ11, u1
〉]
ds
}
+ ε2E
{〈
G1X1(T ), X1(T )
〉
+
∫ T
t
[〈
Q1X1, X1
〉
+ 2
〈
S11X1, u1
〉
+
〈
R111u1, u1
〉]
ds
}
.
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On the other hand, applying Itoˆ’s formula to s 7→ 〈Y ∗1 (s), X1(s)〉, we obtain
E
{〈
G1X∗(T ) + g1, X1(T )
〉
+
∫ T
t
[〈
Q1X∗ + (S1)⊤u∗ + q1, X1
〉
+
〈
S11X
∗ +R11u
∗ + ρ11, u1
〉]
ds
}
= E
∫ T
t
{〈
−
[
A⊤Y ∗1 + C
⊤Z∗1 +Q
1X∗ + (S1)⊤u∗ + q1
]
, X1
〉
+
〈
Y ∗1 , AX1 +B1u1
〉
+
〈
Z∗1 , CX1 +D1u1
〉
+
〈
Q1X∗ + (S1)⊤u∗ + q1, X1
〉
+
〈
S11X
∗ +R11u
∗ + ρ11, u1
〉}
ds
= E
∫ T
t
〈
B⊤1 Y
∗
1 +D
⊤
1 Z
∗
1 + S
1
1X
∗ +R11u
∗ + ρ11, u1
〉
ds.
Hence,
J1(t, x;u∗1(·) + εu1(·), u
∗
2(·)) − J
1(t, x;u∗1(·), u
∗
2(·))
= 2εE
∫ T
t
〈
B⊤1 Y
∗
1 +D
⊤
1 Z
∗
1 + S
1
1X
∗ +R11u
∗ + ρ11, u1
〉
ds
+ ε2E
{〈
G1X1(T ), X1(T )
〉
+
∫ T
t
[〈
Q1X1, X1
〉
+ 2
〈
S11X1, u1
〉
+
〈
R111u1, u1
〉]
ds
}
.
It follows that
J1(t, x;u∗1(·), u
∗
2(·)) 6 J
1(t, x;u∗1(·) + εu1(·), u
∗
2(·)), ∀u1(·) ∈ U1[t, T ], ∀ ε ∈ R,
if and only if (4.3) holds for i = 1, and
(4.5) B⊤1 Y
∗
1 +D
⊤
1 Z
∗
1 + S
1
1X
∗ +R11u
∗ + ρ11 = 0, a.e. s ∈ [t, T ], a.s.
Similarly,
J2(t, x;u∗1(·), u
∗
2(·)) 6 J
2(t, x;u∗1(·), u
∗
2(·) + εu2(·)), ∀u2(·) ∈ U2[t, T ], ∀ ε ∈ R,
if and only if (4.3) holds for i = 2, and
(4.6) B⊤2 Y
∗
2 +D
⊤
2 Z
∗
2 + S
2
2X
∗ +R22u
∗ + ρ22 = 0, a.e. s ∈ [t, T ], a.s.
Combining (4.5)–(4.6), we obtain (4.2).
Note that (4.1) for i = 1, 2 are two coupled FBSDEs, and these two FBSDEs are coupled through the
relation (4.2). In fact, from (4.2), we see that(
R111 R
1
12
R221 R
2
22
)(
u∗1
u∗2
)
= −
(
B⊤1 Y
∗
1 +D
⊤
1 Z
∗
1 + S
1
1X
∗ + ρ11
B⊤2 Y
∗
2 +D
⊤
2 Z
∗
2 + S
2
2X
∗ + ρ22
)
.
Thus, say, in the case that the coefficient matrix of u∗ is invertible, one has(
u∗1
u∗2
)
= −
(
R111 R
1
12
R221 R
2
22
)−1(
B⊤1 Y
∗
1 +D
⊤
1 Z
∗
1 + S
1
1X
∗ + ρ11
B⊤2 Y
∗
2 +D
⊤
2 Z
∗
2 + S
2
2X
∗ + ρ22
)
.
Plugging the above into (4.1), we see the coupling between the two coupled FBSDEs (with i = 1, 2).
To conclude this section, let us write FBSDE (4.1) and stationarity condition (4.2) more compactly. For
this, we introduce the following:
A(·) =
(
A(·) 0
0 A(·)
)
, B(·) =
(
B(·) 0
0 B(·)
)
≡
(
B1(·) B2(·) 0 0
0 0 B1(·) B2(·)
)
,
C(·) =
(
C(·) 0
0 C(·)
)
, D(·) =
(
D(·) 0
0 D(·)
)
≡
(
D1(·) D2(·) 0 0
0 0 D1(·) D2(·)
)
,
Q(·) =
(
Q1(·) 0
0 Q2(·)
)
, S(·) =
(
S1(·) 0
0 S2(·)
)
, R(·) =
(
R1(·) 0
0 R2(·)
)
,
q(·) =
(
q1(·)
q2(·)
)
, ρ(·) =
(
ρ1(·)
ρ2(·)
)
, G =
(
G1 0
0 G2
)
, g =
(
g1
g2
)
.
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Then 
A(·) ∈ L1(0, T ;R2n×2n), B(·) ∈ L2(0, T ;R2n×2m),
C(·) ∈ L2(0, T ;R2n×2n), D(·) ∈ L∞(0, T ;R2n×2m),
Q(·) ∈ L1(0, T ; S2n), S(·) ∈ L2(0, T ;R2m×2n), R(·) ∈ L∞(0, T ; S2m),
q(·) ∈ L2
F
(Ω;L1(0, T ;R2n)), ρ(·) ∈ L2
F
(0, T ;R2m), G ∈ S2n, g ∈ L2FT (Ω;R
2n).
Further, let
J =

Im1 0
0 0
0 0
0 Im2
 ≡

Im1 0m1×m2
0m2×m1 0m2×m2
0m1×m1 0m1×m2
0m2×m1 Im2
 ∈ R2m×m, Ik = (IkIk
)
∈ R2k×k.
Clearly, one has
B(·)J ≡
(
B1(·) B2(·) 0 0
0 0 B1(·) B2(·)
)
Im1 0
0 0
0 0
0 Im2
 = (B1(·) 00 B2(·)
)
,
D(·)J ≡
(
D1(·) D2(·) 0 0
0 0 D1(·) D2(·)
)
Im1 0
0 0
0 0
0 Im2
 = (D1(·) 00 D2(·)
)
,
J⊤S(·) ≡
(
Im1 0 0 0
0 0 0 Im2
)
S11(·) 0
S12(·) 0
0 S21(·)
0 S22(·)
 = (S11(·) 00 S22(·)
)
,
J⊤R(·) ≡
(
Im1 0 0 0
0 0 0 Im2
)
R11(·) 0
R12(·) 0
0 R21(·)
0 R22(·)
 = (R11(·) 00 R22(·)
)
,
J⊤ρ(·) ≡
(
Im1 0 0 0
0 0 0 Im2
)
ρ11(·)
ρ12(·)
ρ21(·)
ρ22(·)
 = (ρ11(·)ρ22(·)
)
.
With the above notation, FBSDE (4.1) can be written as (suppressing s and dropping ∗)
(4.7)

dX =
(
AX +Bu+ b
)
ds+
(
CX +Du+ σ
)
dW,
dY = −
(
A⊤Y +C⊤Z+QInX + S
⊤Imu+ q
)
ds+ ZdW,
X(t) = x, Y(T ) = GInX(T ) + g,
where
Y(·) =
(
Y1(·)
Y2(·)
)
, Z(·) =
(
Z1(·)
Z2(·)
)
.
and the stationarity condition (4.2) can be written as
(4.8) J⊤
(
B⊤Y +D⊤Z+ SInX +RImu+ ρ
)
= 0, a.e. s ∈ [t, T ], a.s.
Keep in mind that (4.7) is a coupled FBSDE with the coupling given through (4.8).
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5 Closed-Loop Nash Equilibria and Riccati Equations
We now look at closed-loop Nash equilibria for Problem (SDG). Again, for simplicity of notation, we will
suppress the time variable s as long as no confusion arises. First, we present the following result which is a
consequence of Theorem 4.1.
Proposition 5.1. Let (G1)–(G2) hold. Suppose that (Θ∗1(·), v
∗
1(·); Θ
∗
2(·), v
∗
2(·)) ∈ Q1[t, T ] × U1[t, T ] ×
Q2[t, T ]×U2[t, T ] is a closed-loop Nash equilibrium of Problem (SDG) on [t, T ]. DenoteΘ
∗(·)≡(Θ∗1(·)
⊤,Θ∗2(·)
⊤)⊤
and let X(·) be the solution to the Rn×n-valued SDE
(5.1)
{
dX = (A+BΘ∗)Xds+ (C +DΘ∗)XdW, s ∈ [t, T ],
X(t) = I.
Then for i = 1, 2, the adapted solution (Yi(·),Zi(·)) to the R
n×n-valued BSDE
(5.2)

dYi = −
{
(A+BΘ∗)⊤Yi + (C +DΘ
∗)⊤Zi
+
[
Qi + (Θ∗)⊤Si + (Si)⊤Θ∗ + (Θ∗)⊤RiΘ∗
]
X
}
ds+ ZidW, s ∈ [t, T ],
Yi(T ) = G
i
X(T ),
satisfies
(5.3) B⊤i Yi +D
⊤
i Zi + (S
i
i +R
i
iΘ
∗)X = 0, a.e. s ∈ [t, T ], a.s.
Proof. Let us consider state equation (3.13) with the cost functionals defined by (3.14). Denoting
v(·) = (v1(·)
⊤, v2(·)
⊤)⊤, by an argument similar to (3.5), we have:
J˜ i(t, x; v(·)) ≡ J i(t, x; Θ∗(·)X(·) + v(·))
= E
{
〈GiX(T ), X(T )〉+ 2〈gi, X(T )〉
+
∫ T
t
[
〈

Q
i+(Θ∗)⊤Si+(Si)⊤Θ∗+(Θ∗)⊤RiΘ∗ (Si)⊤+(Θ∗)⊤Ri
Si+RiΘ∗ Ri



X
v

,

X
v

〉+2〈

q
i+(Θ∗)⊤ρi
ρi

,

X
v

〉
]
ds
}
.
We know by (ii) of Proposition 3.3 that v∗(·) ≡ (v∗1(·)
⊤, v∗2(·)
⊤)⊤ is an open-loop Nash equilibrium for the
problem with the state equation (3.13) and with the cost functionals J˜ i(t, x; v(·)) for any initial pair (t, x).
Thus, according to Theorem 4.1, we have for i = 1, 2,
(5.4) B⊤i Y
∗
i +D
⊤
i Z
∗
i + (S
i
i +R
i
iΘ
∗)X∗ +Riiv
∗ + ρii = 0, a.e. s ∈ [t, T ], a.s.
with X∗(·) being the solution to the closed-loop system:
(5.5)
{
dX∗ =
[
(A+BΘ∗)X∗ +Bv∗ + b
]
ds+
[
(C +DΘ∗)X∗ +Dv∗ + σ
]
dW, s ∈ [t, T ],
X∗(t) = x,
and (Y ∗i (·), Z
∗
i (·)) being the adapted solution to the following BSDE:
(5.6)

dY ∗i = −
{
(A+BΘ∗)⊤Y ∗i + (C+DΘ
∗)⊤Z∗i +
[
Qi+(Θ∗)⊤Si+(Si)⊤Θ∗+(Θ∗)⊤RiΘ∗
]
X∗
+ (Si +RiΘ∗)⊤v∗ + qi + (Θ∗)⊤ρi
}
ds+ Z∗i dW, s ∈ [t, T ],
Y ∗i (T ) = G
iX∗(T ) + gi.
Since (Θ∗(·), v∗(·)) is independent of x and (5.4)–(5.6) hold for all x ∈ Rn, by subtracting solutions cor-
responding to x and 0, the latter from the former, we see that for any x ∈ Rn, the adapted solution
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(X(·), Yi(·), Zi(·)) (i = 1, 2) to the following FBSDE:
dX = (A+BΘ∗)Xds+ (C +DΘ∗)XdW, s ∈ [t, T ],
dYi = −
{
(A+BΘ∗)⊤Yi + (C +DΘ
∗)⊤Zi
+
[
Qi + (Θ∗)⊤Si + (Si)⊤Θ∗ + (Θ∗)⊤RiΘ∗
]
X
}
ds+ ZidW, s ∈ [t, T ],
X(t) = x, Yi(T ) = G
iX(T ),
satisfies
B⊤i Yi +D
⊤
i Zi + (S
i
i +R
i
iΘ
∗)X = 0, a.e. s ∈ [t, T ], a.s.
The desired result then follows easily.
Now we are ready to present the main result of this section, which characterizes the closed-loop Nash
equilibrium of Problem (SDG).
Theorem 5.2. Let (G1)–(G2) hold. Then (Θ∗(·), v∗(·)) ∈ Q[t, T ]× U [t, T ] is a closed-loop Nash equi-
librium of Problem (SDG) on [t, T ] if and only if the following hold:
(i) For i = 1, 2, the solution Pi(·) ∈ C([t, T ]; S
n) to the Lyapunov type equation
(5.7)

P˙i + PiA+A
⊤Pi + C
⊤PiC +Q
i + (Θ∗)⊤(Ri +D⊤PiD)Θ
∗
+
[
PiB + C
⊤PiD + (S
i)⊤
]
Θ∗ + (Θ∗)⊤
[
B⊤Pi +D
⊤PiC + S
i
]
= 0, a.e. s ∈ [t, T ],
Pi(T ) = G
i,
satisfies the following two conditions:
Riii +D
⊤
i PiDi > 0, a.e. s ∈ [t, T ],(5.8)
B⊤i Pi +D
⊤
i PiC + S
i
i + (R
i
i +D
⊤
i PiD)Θ
∗ = 0, a.e. s ∈ [t, T ].(5.9)
(ii) For i = 1, 2, the adapted solution (ηi(·), ζi(·)) to the BSDE
(5.10)

dηi = −
{
A⊤ηi + C
⊤ζi + (Θ
∗)⊤
[
B⊤ηi +D
⊤ζi +D
⊤Piσ + ρ
i + (Ri +D⊤PiD)v
∗
]
+
[
PiB + C
⊤PiD + (S
i)⊤
]
v∗ + C⊤Piσ + Pib+ q
i
}
ds+ ζidW, s ∈ [t, T ],
ηi(T ) = g
i,
satisfies
(5.11) B⊤i ηi +D
⊤
i ζi +D
⊤
i Piσ + ρ
i
i + (R
i
i +D
⊤
i PiD)v
∗ = 0, a.e. s ∈ [t, T ], a.s.
Proof. We first prove the necessity. Suppose that (Θ∗(·), v∗(·)) is a closed-loop Nash equilibrium of
Problem (SDG) on [t, T ], where Θ∗(·) ≡ (Θ∗1(·)
⊤,Θ∗2(·)
⊤)⊤ and v∗(·) ≡ (v∗1(·)
⊤, v∗2(·)
⊤)⊤. Let X(·) and Yi(·)
(i = 1, 2) be the solutions of (5.1) and (5.2), respectively. Consider the following linear ordinary differential
equation (ODE, for short) which is equivalent to (5.7):
(5.12)

P˙i + Pi(A+BΘ
∗) + (A+BΘ∗)⊤Pi + (C +DΘ
∗)⊤Pi(C +DΘ
∗)
+Qi + (Θ∗)⊤Si + (Si)⊤Θ∗ + (Θ∗)⊤RiΘ∗ = 0, s ∈ [t, T ],
Pi(T ) = G
i.
Such an equation admits a unique solution Pi(·) ∈ C([t, T ]; S
n). By Itoˆ’s formula, we have
d(PiX) = P˙iXds+ Pi(A+ BΘ
∗)Xds+ Pi(C +DΘ
∗)XdW
= −
{
(A+BΘ∗)⊤PiX+ (C +DΘ
∗)⊤Pi(C +DΘ
∗)X
+
[
Qi + (Θ∗)⊤Si + (Si)⊤Θ∗ + (Θ∗)⊤RiΘ∗
]
X
}
ds+ Pi(C +DΘ
∗)XdW.
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Comparing the above with (5.2), by the uniqueness of adapted solutions to BSDEs, one has
Yi = PiX, Zi = Pi(C +DΘ
∗)X; i = 1, 2.
From (5.1), we see that the process X(·) is invertible almost surely. Then, the above together with (5.3) leads
to (5.9). Now let X∗(·) be the solution to (5.5), and for i = 1, 2, let (Y ∗i (·), Z
∗
i (·)) be the adapted solution
to (5.6). Define
(5.13)
{
ηi = Y
∗
i − PiX
∗,
ζi = Z
∗
i − Pi(C +DΘ
∗)X∗ − Pi(Dv
∗ + σ).
Then ηi(T ) = g
i, and
dηi = dY
∗
i − P˙iX
∗ds− PidX
∗
= −
{
(A+BΘ∗)⊤Y ∗i + (C +DΘ
∗)⊤Z∗i + (S
i +RiΘ∗)⊤v∗ + Pi(Bv
∗ + b) + qi + (Θ∗)⊤ρi
+
[
P˙i + Pi(A+BΘ
∗) +Qi + (Θ∗)⊤Si + (Si)⊤Θ∗ + (Θ∗)⊤RiΘ∗
]
X∗
}
ds
+
{
Z∗i − Pi
[
(C +DΘ∗)X∗ +Dv∗ + σ
]}
dW
= −
{
(A+BΘ∗)⊤Y ∗i + (C +DΘ
∗)⊤Z∗i + (S
i +RiΘ∗)⊤v∗ + Pi(Bv
∗ + b) + qi + (Θ∗)⊤ρi
− (A+BΘ∗)⊤PiX
∗ − (C +DΘ∗)⊤Pi(C +DΘ
∗)X∗
}
ds+ ζidW
= −
{
(A+BΘ∗)⊤ηi + (C +DΘ
∗)⊤ζi + (C +DΘ
∗)⊤Pi(Dv
∗ + σ)
+ (Si +RiΘ∗)⊤v∗ + Pi(Bv
∗ + b) + qi + (Θ∗)⊤ρi
}
ds+ ζidW
= −
{
A⊤ηi + C
⊤ζi + (Θ
∗)⊤
[
B⊤ηi +D
⊤ζi +D
⊤Piσ + ρ
i + (Ri +D⊤PiD)v
∗
]
+
[
PiB + C
⊤PiD + (S
i)⊤
]
v∗ + C⊤Piσ + Pib+ q
i
}
ds+ ζidW.
Thus, (ηi, ζi) is the adapted solution to BSDE (5.10). Next, from the proof of Proposition 5.1 we know that
(5.4) holds. Thus (noting (5.9) and (5.13)),
0 = B⊤i Y
∗
i +D
⊤
i Z
∗
i + (S
i
i +R
i
iΘ
∗)X∗ +Riiv
∗ + ρii
= B⊤i ηi+D
⊤
i ζi+D
⊤
i Piσ+ρ
i
i+(R
i
i+D
⊤
i PiD)v
∗+
[
B⊤i Pi+D
⊤
i PiC+S
i
i+(R
i
i+D
⊤
i PiD)Θ
∗
]
X∗
= B⊤i ηi +D
⊤
i ζi +D
⊤
i Piσ + ρ
i
i + (R
i
i +D
⊤
i PiD)v
∗,
which is (5.11). The proof of (5.8) will be included in the proof of sufficiency.
To prove the sufficiency, we take any v(·) = (v1(·)
⊤, v2(·)
⊤)⊤ ∈ U1[t, T ] × U2[t, T ]. Denote w = (v
⊤
1 ,
(v∗2)
⊤)⊤, and let
X(·) = X(· ; t, x,Θ∗1(·), v1(·),Θ
∗
2(·), v
∗
2(·))
be the state process corresponding to (t, x) and (Θ∗1(·), v1(·),Θ
∗
2(·), v
∗
2(·)). By Itoˆ’s formula, we have
E
[〈
G1X(T ), X(T )
〉
+ 2
〈
g1, X(T )
〉]
− E
[
〈P1(t)x, x〉 + 2〈η1(t), x〉
]
= E
∫ T
t
{〈
P˙1X,X
〉
+ 2〈P1X, (A+BΘ
∗)X +Bw + b〉
+
〈
P1
[
(C +DΘ∗)X +Dw + σ
]
, (C +DΘ∗)X +Dw + σ
〉
− 2
〈
A⊤η1 + C
⊤ζ1 + (Θ
∗)⊤
[
B⊤η1 +D
⊤ζ1 +D
⊤P1σ + ρ
1 + (R1 +D⊤P1D)v
∗
]
, X
〉
− 2
〈[
P1B + C
⊤P1D + (S
1)⊤
]
v∗ + C⊤P1σ + P1b+ q
1, X
〉
+ 2〈η1, (A+BΘ
∗)X +Bw + b〉+ 2〈ζ1, (C +DΘ
∗)X +Dw + σ〉
}
ds
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= E
∫ T
t
{〈[
P˙1 + P1(A+BΘ
∗) + (A+BΘ∗)⊤P1 + (C +DΘ
∗)⊤P1(C +DΘ
∗)
]
X,X
〉
+ 2〈P1X,Bw + b〉+ 2〈P1(C +DΘ
∗)X,Dw + σ〉+ 〈P1(Dw + σ), Dw + σ〉
− 2
〈
(Θ∗)⊤
[
D⊤P1σ + ρ
1 + (R1 +D⊤P1D)v
∗
]
, X
〉
− 2
〈[
P1B + C
⊤P1D + (S
1)⊤
]
v∗ + C⊤P1σ + P1b+ q
1, X
〉
+ 2〈η1, Bw + b〉+ 2〈ζ1, Dw + σ〉
}
ds
= E
∫ T
t
{〈[
P˙1 + P1(A+BΘ
∗) + (A+BΘ∗)⊤P1 + (C +DΘ
∗)⊤P1(C +DΘ
∗)
]
X,X
〉
+ 2
〈
(P1B + C
⊤P1D)w −
[
P1B + C
⊤P1D + (S
1)⊤
]
v∗ − q1, X
〉
+ 2
〈
D⊤P1Dw − (R
1 +D⊤P1D)v
∗ − ρ1,Θ∗X
〉
+
〈
D⊤P1Dw,w
〉
+ 2
〈
B⊤η1 +D
⊤ζ1 +D
⊤P1σ,w
〉
+ 〈P1σ, σ〉 + 2〈η1, b〉+ 2〈ζ1, σ〉
}
ds.
On the other hand, we have
J1(t, x; Θ∗X(·) + w(·)) − E
[〈
G1X(T ), X(T )
〉
+ 2
〈
g1, X(T )
〉]
= E
∫ T
t
[〈
Q
1+(Θ∗)⊤S1+(S1)⊤Θ∗+(Θ∗)⊤R1Θ∗ (S1)⊤+(Θ∗)⊤R1
S1+R1Θ∗ R1



X
w

,

X
w


〉
+2
〈
q
1+(Θ∗)⊤ρ1
ρ1

,

X
w


〉]
ds
= E
∫ T
t
{〈[
Q1 + (Θ∗)⊤S1 + (S1)⊤Θ∗ + (Θ∗)⊤R1Θ∗
]
X,X
〉
+ 2
〈
(S1)⊤w + q1, X
〉
+ 2
〈
R1w + ρ1,Θ∗X
〉
+
〈
R1w,w
〉
+ 2
〈
ρ1, w
〉}
ds.
Combining the above two equations, together with equation (5.12) (which is equivalent to (5.7)) and condi-
tions (5.9) and (5.11), one obtains
J1(t, x; Θ∗X(·) + w(·)) − E
[
〈P1(t)x, x〉 + 2〈η1(t), x〉
]
= E
∫ T
t
{
2
〈[
P1B + C
⊤P1D + (S
1)⊤
]
(w − v∗), X
〉
+ 2
〈
(R1 +D⊤P1D)(w − v
∗),Θ∗X
〉
+
〈
(R1 +D⊤P1D)w,w
〉
+ 2
〈
B⊤η1 +D
⊤ζ1 +D
⊤P1σ + ρ
1, w
〉
+ 〈P1σ, σ〉 + 2〈η1, b〉+ 2〈ζ1, σ〉
}
ds
= E
∫ T
t
{
2
〈[
P1B1 + C
⊤P1D1 + (S
1
1)
⊤
]
(v1 − v
∗
1), X
〉
+ 2
〈
(R11 +D
⊤
1 P1D)
⊤(v1 − v
∗
1),Θ
∗X
〉
+
〈
(R111 +D
⊤
1 P1D1)v1, v1
〉
+ 2
〈
(R112 +D
⊤
1 P1D2)v
∗
2 , v1
〉
+
〈
(R122 +D
⊤
2 P1D2)v
∗
2 , v
∗
2
〉
+ 2
〈
B⊤1 η1 +D
⊤
1 ζ1 +D
⊤
1 P1σ + ρ
1
1, v1
〉
+ 2
〈
B⊤2 η1 +D
⊤
2 ζ1 +D
⊤
2 P1σ + ρ
1
2, v
∗
2
〉
+ 〈P1σ, σ〉 + 2〈η1, b〉+ 2〈ζ1, σ〉
}
ds
= E
∫ T
t
{〈
(R111 +D
⊤
1 P1D1)v1, v1
〉
− 2
〈
(R111 +D
⊤
1 P1D1)v
∗
1 , v1
〉
+
〈
(R122 +D
⊤
2 P1D2)v
∗
2 , v
∗
2
〉
+ 2
〈
B⊤2 η1 +D
⊤
2 ζ1 +D
⊤
2 P1σ + ρ
1
2, v
∗
2
〉
+ 〈P1σ, σ〉 + 2〈η1, b〉+ 2〈ζ1, σ〉
}
ds
= E
∫ T
t
{〈
(R111 +D
⊤
1 P1D1)(v1 − v
∗
1), v1 − v
∗
1
〉
−
〈
(R111 +D
⊤
1 P1D1)v
∗
1 , v
∗
1
〉
+
〈
(R122 +D
⊤
2 P1D2)v
∗
2 , v
∗
2
〉
+ 2
〈
B⊤2 η1 +D
⊤
2 ζ1 +D
⊤
2 P1σ + ρ
1
2, v
∗
2
〉
+ 〈P1σ, σ〉 + 2〈η1, b〉+ 2〈ζ1, σ〉
}
ds.
Consequently,
J1(t, x; Θ∗X(·) + w(·)) − J1(t, x; Θ∗X∗(·) + v∗(·)) = E
∫ T
t
〈
(R111 +D
⊤
1 P1D1)(v1 − v
∗
1), v1 − v
∗
1
〉
ds.
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It follows that for any v1(·) ∈ U1[t, T ],
J1(t, x; Θ∗1(·)X
∗(·) + v∗1(·),Θ
∗
2(·)X(·) + v
∗
2(·)) 6 J
1(t, x; Θ∗1(·)X(·) + v1(·),Θ
∗
2(·)X(·) + v
∗
2(·)),
if and only if
R111 +D
⊤
1 P1D1 > 0, a.e. s ∈ [t, T ].
Similarly, for any v2(·) ∈ U2[t, T ],
J2(t, x; Θ∗1(·)X
∗(·) + v∗1(·),Θ
∗
2(·)X(·) + v
∗
2(·)) 6 J
2(t, x; Θ∗1(·)X(·) + v
∗
1(·),Θ
∗
2(·)X(·) + v2(·)),
if and only if
R222 +D
⊤
2 P2D2 > 0, a.e. s ∈ [t, T ].
This proves the sufficiency, as well as the necessity of (5.8).
Note that condition (5.9) is equivalent to the following:(
B⊤1 P1 +D
⊤
1 P1C + S
1
1
B⊤2 P2 +D
⊤
2 P2C + S
2
2
)
+
(
R11 +D
⊤
1 P1D
R22 +D
⊤
2 P2D
)
Θ∗ = 0.
Therefore,
(5.14) Θ∗ = −
(
R11 +D
⊤
1 P1D
R22 +D
⊤
2 P2D
)−1(
B⊤1 P1 +D
⊤
1 P1C + S
1
1
B⊤2 P2 +D
⊤
2 P2C + S
2
2
)
,
provided the involved inverse (which is an Rm×m-valued function) exists. By plugging such a Θ∗(·) into
(5.7), we see that the equations for P1(·) and P2(·) are coupled, symmetric, and of Riccati type.
Now, let us try to rewrite the Riccati equation in a more compact form. Note that (recalling the notation
we introduced in the previous section)
0 =
(
B⊤1 P1 +D
⊤
1 P1C + S
1
1
B⊤2 P2 +D
⊤
2 P2C + S
2
2
)
+
(
R11 +D
⊤
1 P1D
R22 +D
⊤
2 P2D
)
Θ∗
=
(
B⊤1 0
0 B⊤2
)(
P1 0
0 P2
)(
In
In
)
+
(
D⊤1 0
0 D⊤2
)(
P1 0
0 P2
)(
C 0
0 C
)(
In
In
)
+
(
Im1 0 0 0
0 0 0 Im2
)(
S1 0
0 S2
)(
In
In
)
+
[(
Im1 0 0 0
0 0 0 Im2
)(
R1 0
0 R2
)(
Im
Im
)
+
(
D⊤1 0
0 D⊤2
)(
P1 0
0 P2
)(
D 0
0 D
)(
Im
Im
)]
Θ∗
≡ J⊤
(
B⊤P+D⊤PC+ S
)
In +
[
J⊤
(
R+D⊤PD
)
Im
]
Θ∗,
with
P(·) ≡
(
P1(·) 0
0 P2(·)
)
.
Hence, in the case that
[
J⊤
(
R+D⊤PD
)
Im
]−1
≡
(
R11 +D
⊤
1 P1D
R22 +D
⊤
2 P2D
)−1
exists and is bounded, we have
(5.15) Θ∗ = −
[
J⊤
(
R+D⊤PD
)
Im
]−1
J⊤
(
B⊤P+D⊤PC+ S
)
In,
which is the same as (5.14). On the other hand, (5.7) can be written as
0 =
(
P˙1 0
0 P˙2
)
+
(
P1 0
0 P2
)(
A 0
0 A
)
+
(
A 0
0 A
)⊤(
P1 0
0 P2
)
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+(
C 0
0 C
)⊤(
P1 0
0 P2
)(
C 0
0 C
)
+
(
Q1 0
0 Q2
)
+
(
Θ∗ 0
0 Θ∗
)⊤(
R1 +D⊤P1D 0
0 R2 +D⊤P2D
)(
Θ∗ 0
0 Θ∗
)
+
(
P1B + C
⊤P1D + (S
1)⊤ 0
0 P2B + C
⊤P2D + (S
2)⊤
)(
Θ∗ 0
0 Θ∗
)
+
(
Θ∗ 0
0 Θ∗
)⊤(
B⊤P1 +D
⊤P1C + S
1 0
0 B⊤P2 +D
⊤P2C + S
2
)
.
Consequently, one sees that the following holds:
(5.16)

P˙+PA+A⊤P+C⊤PC+Q+ Θ⊤
(
R +D⊤PD
)
Θ
+
(
PB+C⊤PD+ S⊤
)
Θ+ Θ⊤
(
B⊤P+D⊤PC+ S
)
= 0, a.e. s ∈ [t, T ],
P(T ) =G,
where
Θ(·) =
(
Θ∗(·) 0
0 Θ∗(·)
)
,
and Θ∗ is given by (5.15). Clearly, (5.16) is symmetric.
6 Two Examples
From the previous sections, we see that the existence of an open-loop Nash equilibrium is equivalent to the
solvability of a coupled system of two FBSDEs, together with the convexity condition for the cost functionals
(see (4.3)); and that the existence of a closed-loop Nash equilibrium is equivalent to the solvability of a coupled
system of two symmetric Riccati equations satisfying certain type of non-negativity condition (see (5.8)).
Then a natural question is: Are open-loop and closed-loop Nash equilibria really different? In this section,
we will present two examples showing that they are indeed different.
The following example shows that Problem (SDG) may have only open-loop Nash equilibria.
Example 6.1. Consider the following Problem (SDG) with one-dimensional state equation{
dX(s) =
[
u1(s) + u2(s)
]
ds+
[
u1(s)− u2(s)
]
dW (s), s ∈ [t, 1],
X(t) = x,
and cost functionals
J1(t, x;u1(·), u2(·)) = J
2(t, x;u1(·), u2(·)) = EX(1)
2 ≡ J(t, x;u1(·), u2(·)).
Let β > 11−t . We claim that(
u
β
1 (s), u
β
2 (s)
)
= −
(
βx
2
1[t,t+ 1
β
](s),
βx
2
1[t,t+ 1
β
](s)
)
, s ∈ [t, 1],
is an open-loop Nash equilibrium of the problem for the initial pair (t, x). Indeed, it is clear that for any
u1(·) ∈ L
2
F
(t, 1;R),
J(t, x;u1(·), u
β
2 (·)) > 0.
On the other hand, the state process Xβ(·) corresponding to
(
u
β
1 (s), u
β
2 (s)
)
and (t, x) satisfies Xβ(1) = 0.
Hence,
J(t, x;uβ1 (·), u
β
2 (·)) = 0 6 J(t, x;u1(·), u
β
2 (·)), ∀u1(·) ∈ L
2
F
(t, 1;R).
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Likewise,
J(t, x;uβ1 (·), u
β
2 (·)) = 0 6 J(t, x;u
β
1 (·), u2(·)), ∀u2(·) ∈ L
2
F
(t, 1;R).
This establishes the claim.
However, this problem does not admit a closed-loop Nash equilibrium. We now show this by contradiction.
Suppose (Θ∗1(·), v
∗
1(·); Θ
∗
2(·), v
∗
2(·)) is a closed-loop Nash equilibrium. Consider the corresponding ODEs in
Theorem 5.2, which now become
(6.1)
{
P˙i + Pi(Θ
∗
1 −Θ
∗
2)
2 + 2Pi(Θ
∗
1 +Θ
∗
2) = 0,
Pi(1) = 1,
i = 1, 2.
The corresponding constraints read
(6.2) P1, P2 > 0, P1 + P1(Θ
∗
1 −Θ
∗
2) = 0, P2 − P2(Θ
∗
1 −Θ
∗
2) = 0.
Since P1(·) and P2(·) satisfy the same ODE (6.1), we have P1(·) = P2(·). Then (6.2) implies P1(·) = 0, which
contradicts the terminal condition P1(1) = 1.
The following example shows that Problem (SDG) may have only closed-loop Nash equilibria.
Example 6.2. Consider the following Problem (SDG) with one-dimensional state equation{
dX(s) = u1(s)ds+ u2(s)dW (s), s ∈ [t, 1],
X(t) = x,
and cost functionals
J1(t, x;u1(·), u2(·)) = E
{
|X(1)|2 +
∫ 1
t
|u1(s)|
2ds
}
,
J2(t, x;u1(·), u2(·)) = E
{
− |X(1)|2 +
∫ 1
t
[
− |X(s)|2 + |u2(s)|
2
]
ds
}
.
We claim that the problem admits a closed-loop Nash equilibrium of form (Θ1(·), 0; Θ2(·), 0). In fact, by
Theorem 5.2, we need to solve the following Riccati equations for P1(·) and P2(·):
P˙1(s) + P1(s)Θ2(s)
2 + 2P1(s)Θ1(s) + Θ1(s)
2 = 0,
P1(1) = 1,
P1(s) + Θ1(s) = 0,
(6.3)

P˙2(s) + P2(s)Θ2(s)
2 + 2P2(s)Θ1(s) + Θ2(s)
2 − 1 = 0,
P2(1) = −1,
1 + P2(s) > 0,
[1 + P2(s)]Θ2(s) = 0.
(6.4)
By the fourth equation in (6.4), we may assume Θ2(·) = 0. Then (6.3)–(6.4) become (taking into account
Θ1(·) = −P1(·) from the third equation in (6.3)){
P˙1(s) = P1(s)
2,
P1(1) = 1,
{
P˙2(s) = 2P1(s)P2(s) + 1,
P2(1) = −1, 1 + P2(s) > 0.
A straightforward calculation leads to
P1(s) =
1
2− s
, P2(s) =
−(2− s)3 − 2
3(2− s)2
.
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Therefore, ((2 − s)−1, 0; 0, 0) is a closed-loop Nash equilibrium of the problem.
Next, we claim that the problem does not have open-loop Nash equilibria. Indeed, suppose (u∗1(·), u
∗
2(·))
is an open-loop Nash equilibrium for some initial pair (t, x). Then u∗2(·) is an open-loop optimal control of
the following Problem (SLQ) with state equation
(6.5)
{
dX(s) = u∗1(s)ds+ u2(s)dW (s), s ∈ [t, 1],
X(t) = x,
and cost functional
(6.6) J˜(t, x;u2(·)) = E
{
− |X(1)|2 +
∫ 1
t
[
− |X(s)|2 + |u2(s)|
2
]
ds
}
.
For any u2(·) ∈ L
2
F
(t, 1;R), the corresponding solution to (6.5) is given by
(6.7) X(s) = x+
∫ s
t
u∗1(r)dr +
∫ s
t
u2(r)dW (r).
Let ε > 0 be undetermined. Substituting (6.7) into (6.6) and using the inequality (a + b)2 > (1 − 1
ε
)a2 +
(1− ε)b2, we see
J˜(t, x;u2(·)) 6
(1
ε
− 1
)
E
(
x+
∫ 1
t
u∗1(s)ds
)2
+ (ε− 1)E
(∫ 1
t
u2(s)dW (s)
)2
+
(1
ε
− 1
)
E
∫ 1
t
(
x+
∫ s
t
u∗1(r)dr
)2
ds
+(ε− 1)E
∫ 1
t
(∫ s
t
u2(r)dW (r)
)2
ds+ E
∫ 1
t
|u2(s)|
2ds
=
(1
ε
− 1
)
E
[(
x+
∫ 1
t
u∗1(s)ds
)2
+
∫ 1
t
(
x+
∫ s
t
u∗1(r)dr
)2
ds
]
+ εE
∫ 1
t
|u2(s)|
2ds+ (ε− 1)E
∫ 1
t
∫ s
t
|u2(r)|
2drds.
Now, by taking u2(s) = λ, λ ∈ R, we have
J˜(t, x;λ) 6
(1
ε
− 1
)
E
[(
x+
∫ 1
t
u∗1(s)ds
)2
+
∫ 1
t
(
x+
∫ s
t
u∗1(r)dr
)2
ds
]
+
λ2(1− t)
2
[
2ε+ (ε− 1)(1− t)
]
.
Choosing ε > 0 small enough so that 2ε+ (ε− 1)(1− t) < 0 and then letting λ→∞, we see that
inf
u2(·)∈L2F(t,1;R)
J˜(t, x;u2(·)) = −∞,
which contradicts the fact that u∗2(·) is an open-loop optimal control of the associated LQ problem.
7 Closed-Loop Representation of Open-Loop Nash Equilibria
Inspired by the decoupling technique introduced in [15, 16, 24, 25], we now look at the solvability of FBSDE
(4.1)–(4.2). Recall that with the notation introduced in Section 4, (4.1) and (4.2) are equivalent to (4.7)
and (4.8), respectively. To solve FBSDE (4.7)–(4.8), let (η(·), ζ (·)) be the adapted solution to the following
BSDE for some undetermined α : [t, T ]× Ω→ R2n:{
dη(s) = α(s)ds + ζ (s)dW (s), s ∈ [t, T ],
η(T ) = g,
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where
η(·) =
(
η1(·)
η2(·)
)
, ζ (·) =
(
ζ1(·)
ζ2(·)
)
.
Let (X(·),Y(·),Z(·)) be an adapted solution to FBSDE (4.7). Suppose the following holds:
(7.1) Y(·) =
(
Π1(·)X(·) + η1(·)
Π2(·)X(·) + η2(·)
)
≡ Π(·)X(·) + η(·), Π(·) ,
(
Π1(·)
Π2(·)
)
,
for some differentiable maps Πi : [t, T ]→ R
n×n with Πi(T ) = G
i. By Itoˆ’s formula, we have
−
(
A⊤Y +C⊤Z+QInX + S
⊤Imu+ q
)
ds+ ZdW (s) = dY
=
[
Π˙X +Π(AX +Bu+ b) + α
]
ds+
[
Π(CX +Du+ σ) + ζ
]
dW (s)
=
[
(Π˙+ΠA)X +ΠBu+Πb+ α
]
ds+
[
ΠCX +ΠDu+Πσ + ζ
]
dW (s).
Hence, one should have
(7.2) Z = ΠCX +ΠDu+Πσ + ζ .
Then the stationarity condition (4.8) becomes
0 = J⊤
(
B⊤Y +D⊤Z+ SInX +RImu+ ρ
)
= J⊤
[
B⊤(ΠX + η) +D⊤(ΠCX +ΠDu+Πσ + ζ ) + SInX +RImu+ ρ
]
= J⊤
(
B⊤Π+D⊤ΠC + SIn
)
X + J⊤
(
RIm +D
⊤ΠD
)
u+ J⊤
(
B⊤η +D⊤ζ +D⊤Πσ + ρ
)
.
Note that
J⊤
(
RIm +D
⊤ΠD
)
=
(
Im1 0 0 0
0 0 0 Im2
)(
R1 +D⊤Π1D
R2 +D⊤Π2D
)
=
(
R111 +D
⊤
1 Π1D1 R
1
12 +D
⊤
1 Π1D2
R221 +D
⊤
2 Π2D1 R
2
22 +D
⊤
2 Π2D2
)
.
This is an Rm×m-valued function which is not symmetric in general, even Π1 and Π2 are symmetric. We
now assume that the above is invertible. Then one has
(7.3)
u = −
[
J⊤(RIm +D
⊤ΠD)
]−1
J⊤
(
B⊤Π+D⊤ΠC + SIn
)
X
−
[
J⊤(RIm +D
⊤ΠD)
]−1
J⊤
(
B⊤η +D⊤ζ +D⊤Πσ + ρ
)
,
and
0 =
(
Π˙+ΠA
)
X +ΠBu+Πb+ α+A⊤(ΠX + η)
+C⊤(ΠCX +ΠDu+Πσ + ζ ) +QInX + S
⊤Imu+ q
=
(
Π˙+ΠA+A⊤Π+C⊤ΠC +QIn
)
X +
(
ΠB +C⊤ΠD + S⊤Im
)
u
+α+A⊤η +C⊤ζ +Πb+C⊤Πσ + q
=
(
Π˙+ΠA+A⊤Π+C⊤ΠC +QIn
)
X
−
(
ΠB +C⊤ΠD + S⊤Im
)[
J⊤(RIm +D
⊤ΠD)
]−1
J⊤
(
B⊤Π+D⊤ΠC + SIn
)
X
−
(
ΠB +C⊤ΠD + S⊤Im
)[
J⊤(RIm +D
⊤ΠD)
]−1
J⊤
(
B⊤η +D⊤ζ +D⊤Πσ + ρ
)
+α+A⊤η +C⊤ζ +Πb+C⊤Πσ + q
=
{
Π˙+ΠA+A⊤Π+C⊤ΠC +QIn
−
(
ΠB +C⊤ΠD + S⊤Im
)[
J⊤(RIm +D
⊤ΠD)
]−1
J⊤
(
B⊤Π+D⊤ΠC + SIn
)}
X
−
(
ΠB +C⊤ΠD + S⊤Im
)[
J⊤(RIm +D
⊤ΠD)
]−1
J⊤
(
B⊤η +D⊤ζ +D⊤Πσ + ρ
)
+α+A⊤η +C⊤ζ +Πb+C⊤Πσ + q.
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Now, let Π(·) be the solution to the following Riccati equation:
(7.4)

Π˙+ΠA+A⊤Π+C⊤ΠC +QIn
−
(
ΠB +C⊤ΠD + S⊤Im
)[
J⊤(RIm+D
⊤ΠD)
]−1
J⊤
(
B⊤Π+D⊤ΠC + SIn
)
= 0, s ∈ [t, T ],
Π(T ) = GIn.
Then the above leads to the BSDE for (η(·), ζ (·)) of the following form:
(7.5)

dη = −
{(
A⊤ −
(
ΠB +C⊤ΠD + S⊤Im
)[
J⊤(RIm +D
⊤ΠD)
]−1
J⊤B⊤
)
η
+
(
C⊤ −
(
ΠB +C⊤ΠD + S⊤Im
)[
J⊤(RIm +D
⊤ΠD)
]−1
J⊤D⊤
)
ζ
+
(
C⊤ −
(
ΠB +C⊤ΠD + S⊤Im
)[
J⊤(RIm +D
⊤ΠD)
]−1
J⊤D⊤
)
Πσ
+Πb+ q−
(
ΠB +C⊤ΠD + S⊤Im
)[
J⊤(RIm +D
⊤ΠD)
]−1
J⊤ρ
}
ds+ ζdW, s ∈ [t, T ],
η(T ) = g.
Hence, we have the following result.
Theorem 7.1. Let (G1)–(G2) hold and let t ∈ [0, T ) be given. Suppose that the convexity condition
(4.3) holds for i = 1, 2, and that the Riccati equation (7.4) admits a solution Π(·). Let (η(·), ζ (·)) be the
adapted solution to BSDE (7.5) and let X(·) be the solution to the following FSDE with an arbitrary initial
state x:
(7.6)

dX =
{(
A−B
[
J⊤(RIm +D
⊤ΠD)
]−1
J⊤
(
B⊤Π+D⊤ΠC + SIn
))
X
−B
[
J⊤(RIm +D
⊤ΠD)
]−1
J⊤
(
B⊤η +D⊤ζ +D⊤Πσ + ρ
)
+ b
}
ds
+
{(
C −D
[
J⊤(RIm +D
⊤ΠD)
]−1
J⊤
(
B⊤Π+D⊤ΠC + SIn
))
X
−D
[
J⊤(RIm +D
⊤ΠD)
]−1
J⊤
(
B⊤η +D⊤ζ +D⊤Πσ + ρ
)
+ σ
}
dW, s ∈ [t, T ],
X(t) = x.
Then the process u(·) defined by (7.3) is an open-loop Nash equilibrium of Problem (SDG) for (t, x).
Proof. From the above procedure, we see that with u(·) defined by (7.3), the triple (X(·),Y(·), Z(·))
defined through FSDE (7.6), (7.1) and (7.2), is an adapted solution to FBSDE (4.7), and that the stationarity
condition (4.8) holds. Hence, together with the convexity condition (4.3), making use of Theorem 4.1, we
see that u(·) is an open-loop Nash equilibrium of Problem (SDG) for (t, x).
Under the assumptions of Theorem 7.1, Problem (SDG) admits an open-loop Nash equilibrium for every
initial state x, and the open-loop Nash equilibria take the following form:
(7.7) u(·) = Θ(·)X(·) + v(·),
for some (Θ(·), v(·)) ∈ Q[t, T ] × U [t, T ] which is independent of x. The above (7.7) is called a closed-loop
representation of the open-loop Nash equilibria of Problem (SDG). More precisely, we have the following
definition.
Definition 7.2. We say that open-loop Nash equilibria of Problem (SDG) on [t, T ] admit a closed-loop
representation, if there exists a pair (Θ(·), v(·)) ∈ Q[t, T ]×U [t, T ] such that for any initial state x ∈ Rn, the
process
(7.8) u(s) , Θ(s)X(s) + v(s), s ∈ [t, T ]
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is an open-loop Nash equilibrium of Problem (SDG) for (t, x), where X(·) is the solution to the following
closed-loop system:
(7.9)

dX(s) =
{
[A(s) +B(s)Θ(s)]X(s) +B(s)v(s) + b(s)
}
ds
+
{
[C(s) +D(s)Θ(s)]X(s) +D(s)v(s) + σ(s)
}
dW (s), s ∈ [t, T ],
X(t) = x.
Comparing Definitions 3.2 and 7.2, it is natural to ask whether the closed-loop representation of open-
loop Nash equilibria is the outcome of some closed-loop Nash equilibrium. The following example shows that
this is not the case in general.
Example 7.3. Consider the following state equation:{
dX(s) =
[
u1(s) + u2(s)
]
ds+X(s)dW (s), s ∈ [t, T ],
X(t) = x,
with cost functionals
J1(t, x;u1(·), u2(·)) = E
[
X(T )2 +
∫ T
t
u1(s)
2ds
]
,
J2(t, x;u1(·), u2(·)) = E
[
X(T )2 +
∫ T
t
u2(s)
2ds
]
.
For this case, we have
A = 0, C = 1, B1 = B2 = 1, D1 = D2 = 0, b = σ = 0,
Q1 = Q2 = 0, S1 = S2 = 0, R1 =
(
1 0
0 0
)
, R2 =
(
0 0
0 1
)
,
G1 = G2 = 1, q1 = q2 = 0, ρ1 = ρ2 = 0, g1 = g2 = 0.
Clearly, the convexity condition (4.3) holds for i = 1, 2. In this example, the Riccati equation (7.4) can be
written componentwise as follows:{
Π˙1(s) + Π1(s)−Π1(s)
[
Π1(s) + Π2(s)
]
= 0, s ∈ [t, T ],
Π1(T ) = 1,
(7.10)
{
Π˙2(s) + Π2(s)−Π2(s)
[
Π1(s) + Π2(s)
]
= 0, s ∈ [t, T ],
Π2(T ) = 1.
(7.11)
It is easy to see that
Π1(s) = Π2(s) =
eT−s
2eT−s − 1
are solutions to (7.10) and (7.11), respectively. Note that in this case the adapted solution (η(·), ζ (·)) to
BSDE (7.5) is (0, 0). Then by Theorem 7.1, the open-loop Nash equilibria of this Problem (SDG) on [t, T ]
admit a closed-loop representation given by
(7.12) u1(s) = u2(s) = −
eT−s
2eT−s − 1
X(s), s ∈ [t, T ].
Next we verify that the problem admits a closed-loop Nash equilibrium of form (Θ1(·), 0; Θ2(·), 0). In
light of Theorem 5.2, we need to solve the following Riccati equations for P1(·) and P2(·):
(7.13)

P˙1(s) + P1(s) + Θ1(s)
2 + 2P1(s)
[
Θ1(s) + Θ2(s)
]
= 0,
P1(T ) = 1,
P1(s) + Θ1(s) = 0,
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and
(7.14)

P˙2(s) + P2(s) + Θ2(s)
2 + 2P2(s)
[
Θ1(s) + Θ2(s)
]
= 0,
P2(T ) = 1,
P2(s) + Θ2(s) = 0.
Noting the third equations in (7.13) and (7.14), we can further write (7.13)-(7.14) as follows:{
P˙1(s) = P1(s)
2 + 2P1(s)P2(s)− P1(s),
P1(T ) = 1,
(7.15)
{
P˙2(s) = P2(s)
2 + 2P2(s)P1(s)− P2(s),
P2(T ) = 1.
(7.16)
Now it is easily seen that
P1(s) = P2(s) =
eT−s
3eT−s − 2
.
Hence,
(7.17) Θ1(s) = Θ2(s) = −P1(s) = −
eT−s
3eT−s − 2
.
Comparing (7.12) with (7.17), we see that the closed-loop representation of open-loop Nash equilibria is
different from the outcome of closed-loop Nash equilibria.
Now we give a characterization of the closed-loop representation of open-loop Nash equilibria.
Theorem 7.4. Let (G1)–(G2) hold and let (Θ(·), v(·)) ∈ Q[t, T ]×U [t, T ]. Then open-loop Nash equilibria
of Problem (SDG) on [t, T ] admit the closed-loop representation (7.8) if and only if the following hold:
(i) The convexity condition (4.3) holds for i = 1, 2.
(ii) The solution Π(·) ∈ C([t, T ];Rn×2n) to the ODE on [t, T ]
(7.18)
{
Π˙+ΠA+A⊤Π+C⊤ΠC +QIn +
(
ΠB +C⊤ΠD + S⊤Im
)
Θ = 0,
Π(T ) = GIn,
satisfies
(7.19)
[
J⊤(RIm +D
⊤ΠD)
]
Θ+ J⊤
(
B⊤Π+D⊤ΠC + SIn
)
= 0,
and the adapted solution (η(·), ζ (·)) to the BSDE on [t, T ]
(7.20)
{
dη = −
[
A⊤η +C⊤ζ +
(
ΠB +C⊤ΠD + S⊤Im
)
v +C⊤Πσ +Πb+ q
]
ds+ ζdW,
η(T ) = g,
satisfies
(7.21)
[
J⊤(RIm +D
⊤ΠD)
]
v + J⊤
(
B⊤η +D⊤ζ +D⊤Πσ + ρ
)
= 0.
Proof. For any x ∈ Rn, let X(·), Π(·), and (η(·), ζ (·)) be the solutions to (7.9), (7.18), and (7.20),
respectively. Let u(·) be defined by (7.8) and set
Y = ΠX + η, Z = Π(C +DΘ)X +ΠDv +Πσ + ζ .
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Then Y(T ) = GInX(T ) + g, and
dY = Π˙Xds+ΠdX + dη
=
[
Π˙X +Π(A+BΘ)X +ΠBv +Πb−A⊤η −C⊤ζ
−
(
ΠB +C⊤ΠD + S⊤Im
)
v −C⊤Πσ −Πb− q
]
ds
+
[
Π(C +DΘ)X +ΠDv +Πσ + ζ
]
dW
=
[
−
(
A⊤Π+C⊤ΠC +QIn +C
⊤ΠDΘ+ S⊤ImΘ
)
X −A⊤η −C⊤ζ
−
(
C⊤ΠD + S⊤Im
)
v −C⊤Πσ − q
]
ds+ ZdW
=
{
−A⊤(ΠX + η)−QInX −C
⊤
[
Π(C +DΘ)X +ΠDv +Πσ + ζ
]
− S⊤Im(ΘX + v)− q
}
ds+ ZdW
=
(
−A⊤Y −QInX −C
⊤Z− S⊤Imu− q
)
ds+ ZdW.
This shows that (X(·),Y(·),Z(·), u(·)) satisfies the FBSDE (4.7). According to Theorem 4.1, the process
u(·) defined by (7.8) is an open-loop Nash equilibrium for (t, x) if and only if (i) holds and
0 = J⊤
(
B⊤Y +D⊤Z+ SInX +RImu+ ρ
)
= J⊤
{
B⊤(ΠX + η) +D⊤[Π(C +DΘ)X +ΠDv +Πσ + ζ ] + SInX +RIm(ΘX + v) + ρ
}
= J⊤
[
B⊤Π+D⊤ΠC + SIn + (RIm +D
⊤ΠD)Θ
]
X
+ J⊤
[
B⊤η +D⊤ζ +D⊤Πσ + ρ + (RIm +D
⊤ΠD)v
]
.
Since the initial state x is arbitrary and J⊤[B⊤η +D⊤ζ +D⊤Πσ + ρ + (RIm +D
⊤ΠD)v] is independent
of x, the above leads to (7.19) and (7.21).
Let us write (7.18)–(7.21) componentwise as follows: For i = 1, 2,{
Π˙i +ΠiA+A
⊤Πi + C
⊤ΠiC +Q
i +
[
ΠiB + C
⊤ΠiD + (S
i)⊤
]
Θ = 0,
Πi(T ) = G
i,
(7.22)
(
R11 +D
⊤
1 Π1D
R22 +D
⊤
2 Π2D
)
Θ+
(
B⊤1 Π1 +D
⊤
1 Π1C + S
1
1
B⊤2 Π2 +D
⊤
2 Π2C + S
2
2
)
= 0,(7.23)  dηi = −
{
A⊤ηi + C
⊤ζi +
[
ΠiB + C
⊤ΠiD + (S
i)⊤
]
v + C⊤Πiσ +Πib+ q
i
}
ds+ ζidW,
ηi(T ) = g
i,
(7.24)
(
R11 +D
⊤
1 Π1D
R22 +D
⊤
2 Π2D
)
v +
(
B⊤1 η1 +D
⊤
1 ζ1 +D
⊤
1 Π1σ + ρ
1
1
B⊤2 η2 +D
⊤
2 ζ2 +D
⊤
2 Π2σ + ρ
2
2
)
= 0.(7.25)
Noting the relation (7.23), one sees the equations for Π1(·) and Π2(·) are coupled and none of them is
symmetric. Consequently, Π1(·) and Π2(·) are not symmetric in general. Whereas the Riccati equations
(5.7) for Pi(·) (i = 1, 2) are symmetric. This is the main reason that the closed-loop representation of
open-loop Nash equilibria is different from the outcome of closed-loop Nash equilibria.
8 Zero-Sum Cases
In the previous section, we have seen that for Problem (SDG), the closed-loop representation of open-loop
Nash equilibria is different from the outcome of closed-loop Nash equilibria in general. Now we would like
to take a look at the situation for LQ stochastic two-person zero-sum differential games. In this case, Nash
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equilibria are usually called saddle points. According to (1.4), we have
(8.1)
G1 = −G2 ≡ G, g1 = −g2 ≡ g, Q1(·) = −Q2(·) ≡ Q(·), q1(·) = −q2(·) ≡ q(·),(
R111(·) R
1
12(·)
R121(·) R
1
22(·)
)
≡ −
(
R211(·) R
2
12(·)
R221(·) R
2
22(·)
)
≡
(
R11(·) R12(·)
R21(·) R22(·)
)
≡
(
R1(·)
R2(·)
)
≡ R(·),(
S11(·)
S12(·)
)
= −
(
S21(·)
S22(·)
)
≡
(
S1(·)
S2(·)
)
≡ S(·),
(
ρ11(·)
ρ12(·)
)
= −
(
ρ21(·)
ρ22(·)
)
≡
(
ρ1(·)
ρ2(·)
)
≡ ρ(·),
and
J1(t, x;u1(·), u2(·)) = −J
2(t, x;u1(·), u2(·))
= E
{
〈GX(T ), X(T )〉+ 2〈g,X(T )〉
+
∫ T
t
[
〈


Q(s) S1(s)
⊤ S2(s)
⊤
S1(s) R11(s) R12(s)
S2(s) R21(s) R22(s)




X(s)
u1(s)
u2(s)

,


X(s)
u1(s)
u2(s)

〉+ 2〈


q(s)
ρ1(s)
ρ2(s)

,


X(s)
u1(s)
u2(s)

〉
]
ds
}
≡ J(t, x;u1(·), u2(·)).
Let (Θ(·), v(·)) ∈ Q[t, T ]×U [t, T ] and assume the open-loop saddle points of Problem (SDG) on [t, T ] admit
the closed-loop representation (7.8). The equations (7.22) (i = 1, 2) for Π1(·) and Π2(·) now become{
Π˙1 +Π1A+A
⊤Π1 + C
⊤Π1C +Q+
(
Π1B + C
⊤Π1D + S
⊤
)
Θ = 0,
Π1(T ) = G,
and {
Π˙2 +Π2A+A
⊤Π2 + C
⊤Π2C −Q+
(
Π2B + C
⊤Π2D − S
⊤
)
Θ = 0,
Π2(T ) = −G,
respectively. Obviously, both Π1(·) and −Π2(·) satisfy
(8.2)
{
Π˙ + ΠA+A⊤Π+ C⊤ΠC +Q+
(
ΠB + C⊤ΠD + S⊤
)
Θ = 0,
Π(T ) = G.
Thus, Π1(·) = −Π2(·) ≡ Π(·), and (7.23) becomes(
R1 +D
⊤
1 ΠD
−R2 −D
⊤
2 ΠD
)
Θ+
(
B⊤1 Π+D
⊤
1 ΠC + S1
−B⊤2 Π−D
⊤
2 ΠC − S2
)
= 0,
or equivalently,
(R+D⊤ΠD)Θ +B⊤Π+D⊤ΠC + S = 0.
This is also equivalent to
(8.3)
{
R(B⊤Π+D⊤ΠC + S) ⊆ R(R+D⊤ΠD), a.e. s ∈ [t, T ],
(R+D⊤ΠD)†(B⊤Π+D⊤ΠC + S) ∈ L2(t, T ;Rm×n),
and
(8.4) Θ = −(R+D⊤ΠD)†(B⊤Π+D⊤ΠC + S) + [I − (R +D⊤ΠD)†(R+D⊤ΠD)]θ,
for some θ(·) ∈ L2(t, T ;Rm×n). Upon substitution of (8.4) into (8.2), the latter becomes
(8.5)

Π˙ + ΠA+A⊤Π+ C⊤ΠC +Q
− (ΠB + C⊤ΠD + S⊤)(R +D⊤ΠD)†(B⊤Π+D⊤ΠC + S) = 0, s ∈ [t, T ],
Π(T ) = G,
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with constraints (8.3). Note that equation (8.5) is symmetric. Likewise, we have (η1(·), ζ1(·)) = −(η2(·), ζ2(·)) ≡
(ηΠ(·), ζΠ(·)) satisfying
(8.6)

dηΠ = −
{[
A⊤− (ΠB + C⊤ΠD + S⊤)(R+D⊤ΠD)†B⊤
]
ηΠ
+
[
C⊤− (ΠB + C⊤ΠD + S⊤)(R+D⊤ΠD)†D⊤
]
ζΠ
+
[
C⊤− (ΠB + C⊤ΠD + S⊤)(R+D⊤ΠD)†D⊤
]
Πσ
− (ΠB + C⊤ΠD + S⊤)(R +D⊤ΠD)†ρ+ Πb+ q
}
ds+ ζΠdW, s ∈ [t, T ],
ηΠ(T ) = g,
with constraints
(8.7)
{
B⊤ηΠ +D
⊤ζΠ +D
⊤Πσ + ρ ∈ R(R+D⊤ΠD), a.e. s ∈ [t, T ], a.s.
(R +D⊤ΠD)†(B⊤ηΠ +D
⊤ζΠ +D
⊤Πσ + ρ) ∈ L2
F
(t, T ;Rm),
and in this case,
v = −(R+D⊤ΠD)†(B⊤ηΠ +D
⊤ζΠ +D
⊤Πσ + ρ) +
[
I − (R+D⊤ΠD)†(R +D⊤ΠD)
]
ν,
for some ν(·) ∈ L2
F
(t, T ;Rm). To summarize, we have the following result for LQ stochastic two-person
zero-sum differential games.
Theorem 8.1. Let (G1)–(G2) and (8.1) hold. Then the open-loop saddle points of Problem (SDG) on
[t, T ] admit a closed-loop representation if and only if the following hold:
(i) The following convexity-concavity condition holds: For i = 1, 2,
(8.8)
(−1)i−1E
{∫ T
t
[
〈Q(s)Xi(s), Xi(s)〉 + 2〈Si(s)Xi(s), ui(s)〉 + 〈Rii(s)ui(s), ui(s)〉
]
ds
+ 〈GXi(T ), Xi(T )〉
}
> 0, ∀ui(·) ∈ Ui[t, T ],
where Xi(·) is the solution to FSDE (4.4).
(ii) The Riccati equation (8.5) admits a solution Π(·) ∈ C([t, T ]; Sn) such that (8.3) holds, and the
adapted solution of (8.6) satisfies (8.7).
In the above case, all the closed-loop representations of open-loop saddle points are given by
u =
{
− (R+D⊤ΠD)†(B⊤Π+D⊤ΠC + S) +
[
I − (R +D⊤ΠD)†(R +D⊤ΠD)
]
θ
}
X
− (R+D⊤ΠD)†(B⊤ηΠ +D
⊤ζΠ +D
⊤Πσ + ρ) +
[
I − (R +D⊤ΠD)†(R+D⊤ΠD)
]
ν,
where θ(·) ∈ L2(t, T ;Rm×n) and ν(·) ∈ L2
F
(t, T ;Rm).
Proof. The result can be proved by combining Theorem 7.4 and the previous argument. We leave the
details to the interested reader.
Now let us recall from [23] the characterization of closed-loop saddle points of LQ stochastic two-person
zero-sum differential games.
Theorem 8.2. Let (G1)–(G2) and (8.1) hold. Then Problem (SDG) admits a closed-loop saddle point
on [t, T ] if and only if the following hold:
(i) The Riccati equation
(8.9)

P˙ + PA+A⊤P + C⊤PC +Q
− (PB + C⊤PD + S⊤)(R+D⊤PD)†(B⊤P +D⊤PC + S) = 0, s ∈ [t, T ],
P (T ) = G,
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admits a solution P (·) ∈ C([t, T ]; Sn) such that the following hold:{
R(B⊤P +D⊤PC + S) ⊆ R(R+D⊤PD), a.e. s ∈ [t, T ],
(R +D⊤PD)†(B⊤P +D⊤PC + S) ∈ L2(t, T ;Rm×n),
(8.10)
R11 +D
⊤
1 PD1 > 0, R22 +D
⊤
2 PD2 6 0, a.e. s ∈ [t, T ].(8.11)
(ii) The adapted solution (ηP (·), ζP (·)) of the BSDE on [t, T ]
(8.12)

dηP = −
{[
A⊤− (PB + C⊤PD + S⊤)(R +D⊤PD)†B⊤
]
ηP
+
[
C⊤− (PB + C⊤PD + S⊤)(R+D⊤PD)†D⊤
]
ζP
+
[
C⊤− (PB + C⊤PD + S⊤)(R+D⊤PD)†D⊤
]
Pσ
− (PB + C⊤PD + S⊤)(R +D⊤PD)†ρ+ Pb+ q
}
ds+ ζP dW,
ηP (T ) = g,
satisfies
(8.13)
{
B⊤ηP +D
⊤ζP +D
⊤Pσ + ρ ∈ R(R +D⊤PD), a.e. s ∈ [t, T ], a.s.
(R+D⊤PD)†(B⊤ηP +D
⊤ζP +D
⊤Pσ + ρ) ∈ L2
F
(t, T ;Rm).
In this case, the closed-loop saddle point (Θ∗(·), v∗(·)) admits the following representation:
(8.14)
{
Θ∗ = −(R+D⊤PD)†(B⊤P +D⊤PC + S) +
[
I − (R+D⊤PD)†(R+D⊤PD)
]
θ,
v∗ = −(R+D⊤PD)†(B⊤ηP +D
⊤ζP +D
⊤Pσ + ρ) +
[
I − (R+D⊤PD)†(R +D⊤PD)
]
ν,
where θ(·) ∈ L2(t, T ;Rm×n) and ν(·) ∈ L2
F
(t, T ;Rm).
Comparing Theorems 8.1 and 8.2, one may ask: For LQ stochastic two-person zero-sum differential
games, when both the closed-loop representation of open-loop saddle points and the closed-loop saddle point
exist, does the closed-loop representation coincide with the outcome of the closed-loop saddle point? The
answer to this question is affirmative, as shown by the following result.
Theorem 8.3. Let (G1)–(G2) and (8.1) hold. If both the closed-loop representation of open-loop saddle
points and the closed-loop saddle point exist on [t, T ], then the closed-loop representation coincides with the
outcome of the closed-loop saddle point.
Proof. The proof is immediate from Theorems 8.1 and 8.2, once we show that the solution Π(·) to
the Riccati equation (8.5) with constraints (8.3) coincides with the solution P (·) to (8.9) with constraints
(8.10)–(8.11).
First, we note that if the convexity-concavity condition (8.8) holds for initial time t, it also holds for any
t′ ∈ [t, T ]. Indeed, for any t′ ∈ [t, T ], and any u1(·) ∈ U1[t
′, T ], let X1(·) be the solution to{
dX1(s) =
[
A(s)X1(s) +B1(s)u1(s)
]
ds+
[
C(s)X1(s) +D1(s)u1(s)
]
dW (s), s ∈ [t′, T ],
X1(t
′) = 0,
and define the zero-extension of u1(·) as follows:
[ 0I[t,t′) ⊕ u1](s) =
{
0, s ∈ [t, t′),
u1(s), s ∈ [t
′, T ].
Then u˜1(·) ≡ [ 0I[t,t′) ⊕ u1](·) ∈ U1[t, T ], and due to the initial state being 0, the solution X˜1(s) of{
dX˜1(s) =
[
A(s)X˜1(s) +B1(s)u˜1(s)
]
ds+
[
C(s)X˜1(s) +D1(s)u˜1(s)
]
dW (s), s ∈ [t, T ],
X˜1(t) = 0,
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satisfies
X˜1(s) =
{
0, s ∈ [t, t′),
X1(s), s ∈ [t
′, T ].
Hence,
E
{∫ T
t′
[
〈QX1, X1〉+ 2〈S1X1, u1〉+ 〈R11u1, u1〉
]
ds+ 〈GX1(T ), X1(T )〉
}
= E
{∫ T
t
[〈
QX˜1, X˜1
〉
+ 2
〈
S1X˜1, u˜1
〉
+
〈
R11u˜1, u˜1
〉]
ds+
〈
GX˜1(T ), X˜1(T )
〉}
> 0.
This proves the case i = 1. The case i = 2 can be treated similarly.
Now let (Θ∗(·), v∗(·)) be a closed-loop saddle point of Problem (SDG) on [t, T ]. Under the assumption
of the theorem, it is clear from Theorem 8.1 that for any initial pair (t′, x) with t′ ∈ [t, T ], the outcome
u∗(s) = Θ∗(s)X∗(s) + v∗(s), s ∈ [t′, T ]
of (Θ∗(·), v∗(·)) is an open-loop saddle point for (t′, x), where X∗(·) is the solution to
dX∗(s) =
{
[A(s) +B(s)Θ∗(s)]X∗(s) +B(s)v∗(s) + b(s)
}
ds
+
{
[C(s) +D(s)Θ∗(s)]X∗(s) +D(s)v∗(s) + σ(s)
}
dW (s), s ∈ [t′, T ],
X∗(t′) = x.
By Theorem 8.2, (Θ∗(·), v∗(·)) admits the representation (8.14), and a straightforward calculation shows
that
P˙ + P (A+BΘ∗) + (A+BΘ∗)⊤P + (C +DΘ∗)⊤P (C +DΘ∗)
+ (Θ∗)⊤RΘ∗ + S⊤Θ∗ + (Θ∗)⊤S +Q = 0,
and that the adapted solution (ηP (·), ζP (·)) of (8.12) satisfies
dηP = −
[
(A+BΘ∗)⊤ηP + (C +DΘ
∗)⊤ζP + (C +DΘ
∗)⊤Pσ + (Θ∗)⊤ρ+ Pb+ q
]
ds+ ζP dW.
Then applying Itoˆ’s formula to s 7→ 〈P (s)X∗(s), X∗(s)〉+ 2〈ηP (s), X
∗(s)〉 and noting that
(R+D⊤PD)Θ∗ +B⊤P +D⊤PC + S = 0,
we have
(8.15)
J(t′, x;u∗(·)) = J(t′, x; Θ∗(·)X∗(·) + v∗(·))
= E
{
〈GX∗(T ), X∗(T )〉+ 2〈g,X∗(T )〉+
∫ T
t′
[
〈QX∗, X∗〉+ 2〈SX∗,Θ∗X∗ + v∗〉
+ 〈R(Θ∗X∗ + v∗),Θ∗X∗ + v∗〉+ 2〈q,X∗〉+ 2〈ρ,Θ∗X∗ + v∗〉
]
ds
}
= E
{
〈P (t′)x, x〉 + 2〈ηP (t
′), x〉+
∫ T
t′
[
〈P˙X∗, X∗〉+ 2〈PX∗, (A+BΘ∗)X∗ +Bv∗ + b〉
+ 〈P [(C +DΘ∗)X∗ +Dv∗ + σ], (C +DΘ∗)X∗ +Dv∗ + σ〉
− 2
〈
(A+BΘ∗)⊤ηP + (C +DΘ
∗)⊤ζP + (C +DΘ
∗)⊤Pσ + (Θ∗)⊤ρ+ Pb+ q,X∗
〉
+ 2〈ηP , (A+BΘ
∗)X∗ +Bv∗ + b〉+ 2〈ζP , (C +DΘ
∗)X∗ +Dv∗ + σ〉
+
〈[
Q+ S⊤Θ∗ + (Θ∗)⊤S + (Θ∗)⊤RΘ∗
]
X∗, X∗
〉
+ 2〈(RΘ∗ + S)X∗, v∗〉
+ 2
〈
q + (Θ∗)⊤ρ,X∗
〉
+ 〈Rv∗, v∗〉+ 2〈ρ, v∗〉
]
ds
}
= E
{
〈P (t′)x, x〉 + 2〈ηP (t
′), x〉+
∫ T
t′
[
〈Pσ, σ〉 + 2〈ηP , b〉+ 2〈ζP , σ〉
+
〈
(R+D⊤PD)v∗, v∗
〉
+ 2
〈
B⊤ηP +D
⊤ζP +D
⊤Pσ + ρ, v∗
〉]
ds
}
.
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Next, let θ(·) ∈ L2(t, T ;Rm×n), ν(·) ∈ L2
F
(t, T ;Rm) and denote{
Θ = −(R+D⊤ΠD)†(B⊤Π+D⊤ΠC + S) + [I − (R+D⊤ΠD)†(R+D⊤ΠD)]θ,
v = −(R+D⊤ΠD)†(B⊤ηΠ +D
⊤ζΠ +D
⊤Πσ + ρ) + [I − (R+D⊤ΠD)†(R +D⊤ΠD)]ν.
For any initial pair (t′, x) with t′ ∈ [t, T ], define u(·) ∈ U [t′, T ] by
u(s) = Θ(s)X(s) + v(s), s ∈ [t′, T ],
with X(·) being the solution to
dX(s) =
{
[A(s) +B(s)Θ(s)]X(s) +B(s)v(s) + b(s)
}
ds
+
{
[C(s) +D(s)Θ(s)]X(s) +D(s)v(s) + σ(s)
}
dW (s), s ∈ [t′, T ],
X(t′) = x.
By Theorem 8.1, u(·) is an open-loop saddle point for (t′, x), and by a computation similar to (8.15), we
obtain
(8.16)
J(t′, x;u(·)) = E
{
〈Π(t′)x, x〉+ 2〈ηΠ(t
′), x〉 +
∫ T
t′
[
〈Πσ, σ〉 + 2〈ηΠ, b〉+ 2〈ζΠ, σ〉
+
〈
(R+D⊤ΠD)v, v
〉
+ 2
〈
B⊤ηΠ +D
⊤ζΠ +D
⊤Πσ + ρ, v
〉]
ds
}
.
Since both u∗(·) ≡ (u∗1(·)
⊤, u∗2(·)
⊤)⊤ and u(·) ≡ (u1(·)
⊤, u2(·)
⊤)⊤ are open-loop saddle points for (t′, x), we
have
J(t′, x;u∗1(·), u
∗
2(·)) 6 J(t
′, x;u1(·), u
∗
2(·)) 6 J(t
′, x;u1(·), u2(·))
6 J(t′, x;u∗1(·), u2(·)) 6 J(t
′, x;u∗1(·), u
∗
2(·)).
Therefore, J(t′, x;u∗(·)) = J(t′, x;u(·)) for all (t′, x) with t′ ∈ [t, T ], which, together with (8.15) and (8.16),
yields Π(·) = P (·).
Finally, we have the following corollary for Problem (SLQ), which should be but has not been stated in
[22].
Corollary 8.4. For Problem (SLQ), if the open-loop optimal controls admit a closed-loop representation,
then every open-loop optimal control must be an outcome of a closed-loop optimal strategy.
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